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Introduction 
THE PRESENT article aims at making a contribution to the definition of myth as 
well as to the discussion about the substance of what is commonly referred to as 
'myth.' It does not pretend to give the final answer to all questions related to this 
intricate problem, but to offer some clarification at the present moment, when the 
term 'myth' is freely in use among classical scholars without always being suffi-
ciently defined. In fact the question of definition seems indeed to be avoided. In 
addressing this question I will proceed along two lines and study the nature and 
'existence' of myth from a social as well as from a biological point of view. We have 
to ask how 'myth' operates in the particular culture we are studying, and to con-
sider how the human mind does in fact function in a special 'mythical' way, stud-
ying its relationship to conscious reasoning. By adducing insights from 
anthropological theory I hope to contribute to the definition of the term and by 
presenting some results from psychology I wish to substantiate the claim that 
'mythical phenomena' can be said to be generated by some 'mythical mind.' Both 
answers amount to the conclusion that 'myth' does in fact exist, if we study what I 
provisionally call 'myth' as a subspecies of what commonly is labelled 'symbolic 
phenomena.' This term refers to processes and entities which constitute a complex 
force in the creation and maintenance of culture. 
My justification for these choices is the situation that within our field of classi-
cal studies we are deprived of studying phenomena like 'myth' within their living 
context. This condition may prompt us more easily to project our own scholarly 
habits of documenting and conscious arguing on the object of our study, thereby 
distorting the phenomena or denying their existence altogether. However, by mak-
ing serious attempts at countering these unwanted effects of our own activity, we 
may become more aware of the nature of 'myth.' 
I do not claim to present radically new insights, in fact they are established dis-
courses within the fields to which I refer. However, these insights do not seem to 
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be sufficiently incorporated into our classical studies, which, unfortunately, are 
bound forever to study the cooled vestiges ofliving cultures. 1 It is my wish to bring 
in some life or third dimension into a research field that is working within the de-
serted space of art and the two-dimensional world of paper. In addition I will dis-
cuss a few concrete examples, hoping to stimulate renewed discussion and further 
investigation. 
Terminology and ontological status 
Before starting on the vexed question of definition, I wish to make some prelimi-
nary statements. Some scholars within our field of classical studies are so dissatis-
fied with the general application of the term 'myth' so as to deny the existence of 
'myth' as a distinctive social phenomenon as well as that of 'mythical thought: 
However, the situation that has led them to these conclusions, I think, has partly 
been due to our imprecise distinctions and loose terminology, partly to insuffi-
cient attention given to the nature of the phenomena involved. I will make this 
clear in the following discussion. 
Marcel Detienne, discussing the development of mythological studies, points 
to the ethnocentric bias in the distinction between 'fable' and enlightened dis-
course in early Western research on 'mythology; which understood itself as 'une 
science du scandaleux:2 He has rightly pointed to the inacceptability of Western 
habits of relegating stories presented by 'the natives' to 'myth' while accepting our 
own religious and other tales as 'the truth,' thus separating the grotesque from the 
sensible, the immoral from the moral. 'L'anthropologue est un homme des fron-
tieres: entre les sauvages et les civilises, entre l'enfance de l'humanite et son age 
adulte, entre nous et nos and~tres:3 This attitude is of course nothing but an in-
stance of the universal (?) habit of confronting the 'other' vs. the 'self,' combined 
with a Western 'colonial mentalite' of assuming a fundamental segregation be-
tween the culture of 'the natives' and our Western, contemporary, 'enlightened' 
world.4 The use of the term 'myth' in this sense, a category for defining other peo-
ple as less developed is of course inherent in Wilhelm von Nestle's 'Vom Mythos 
zum Logos' concept.5 It is also prominent in the work of G. S. Kirk.6 
Cf the anthroplogist Gill 1982:37 'We have shown that much of the significance of artifacts is 
inseparable from the context of the cultural and religious processes and associated beliefs and 
principles from which they rise ... Now we should see that commonly these objects come about 
as a result of human actions which are creative in the primary sense, that is, in the sense of bear-
ing cosmic responsibilities, in the sense of making life possible.' 
2 Detienne 1981:36 (1986: 13 ), reviewed from an anthropological viewpoint by Traube 1986. 
3 Detienne 1981:45 (1986:19), 'The anthropologist is a frontierman. Between savages and the civi-
lized, between the childhood of mankind and its maturity, between ourselves and our ancestors.' 
4 Ohnuki-Tierney 1990:2. 
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Recently Claude Calame, agreeing with Detienne, has formulated the problem 
as follows: ' ... myth is not an entity with any ontological existence, but rather a 
Western category which originated in the early days of anthropological thought, 
during the Enlightenment. As a spatially and temporally marked tool of classifica-
tion, the category "myth" is generated by the act of looking at the cultures of others 
from a Eurocentric perspective ... .' 7 
Earlier, Calame expressed himself in the same vein, 'Definitions [of myth] si 
larges ... ne font que demasquer le fait qu'il n'y a pas d'essence ni du mythe ni de 
la mythologie (emphasis added) .'8 The question whether 'myth' is only a fiction of 
Western or Eurocentric culture, I think, should be reformulated into a discussion 
about our justification (or moral right?) to qualify as 'myth' what 'natives' recog-
nise as 'nature' (a short-hand for metaphysical, historical, social, biological or 
whatever reality, cf Pettazzoni 1947-48, referred by Lincoln 1983:76). In other 
words the question whether or not 'myth' is nothing more than a Western fiction 
amounts to the question whether we as academics may make meta-statements 
about 'native' expressions, that is, whether the category of 'myth' is an academic 
fiction or not. I do not think this is so, unless most of Western science is seen as an 
academic fiction too, an imposition of secular analysis on what is seen as sacred by 
(some, most?) other cultures. However, if we include Westerners and academics 
among the 'natives; I think we can confidently proceed to study 'myth' as a phe-
nomenon with an ontological status, although it is an elusive one, due in fact to its 
special nature, a problem to which I shall return.9 
The suspicion Calame throws on looking at the cultures of others from a Euro-
centric perspective is in fact the dilemma of the study of myth. It can in fact hardly 
be studied otherwise than by looking at the cultures of others, which implies that 
5 Nestle '1966:6 'Diesen Weg vom Mythos zum Logos zu gehen, aus der Unmiindigkeit zur 
Miindigkeit des Geistes emporzuwachsen, scheint den arischen Viilkern als denen der hiichstbe-
gabten Rasse vorbehalten geblieben zu sein.' 
6 Kirk 1970:24 'Why should we not say instead, for instance, that the association of myths and rit-
uals in certain social conditions is due to the propensity of men, especially in unhibited and sav-
age societies, for acting out any event or description whatever, whether real or fictitious?' Kirk 
1974: !Sf.,'[ the Cambridge School] rightly perceived that Greek myths are not utterly removed 
from savage ones as a kind of superior species.' 
7 Calame 1996b:23. Cf Calame 1999:121 'We recognize myth as a notion of modern Western 
anthropological thought.' Calame has expressed scepticism as to the motives for identifying an 
entity 'myth.' Calame 1988:10 'De tels concepts [myth and mythology] n' ont pu s'imposer que 
dans une pensee anthropologique encore fortement marquee par Ia croyance au primitif, et par 
consequent a l'irrationalite d'une pensee humaine au seuil de son developpement.' 
8 Calame 1988:9. 
9 Detienne's refusal to accept the notion of myth, has been countered by Brisson 1982, 1998, who 
has attempted a definition of myth according to formal properties of the tale. 
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people belonging to other than European cultures will be best qualified to point to 
the myths of our cultures, or that Western scholars have to defamiliarise them-
selves thoroughly from their culture in order to study 'their own native myths.' 
While dissociating ourselves, then, from previous views of myth, we should realise 
that earlier bias in those studies does not necessarily render studies of 'myth' alto-
gether suspect. 
Furthermore Calame points to the fact that the Greeks lacked a term for what 
we identify as 'myth.'10 However, this fact that the Greek term 'muthos' (J..Lu8o~) 
does not refer to a distinct category of tales among the (early) Greeks, does not 
need to halt us either. There were some expressions which referred to what many 
would call 'myth; the great exploits of ancestors, heroes and demi-gods, under-
stood as belonging to the more or less remote past. The terminology which the 
Greeks could apply to this past wasta palaia ('ta naA.aui), 'the ancient [things, 
events] .' 11 What is interesting about this term is that it does not refer to a particular 
kind of tales, but to certain events, which underscores their status as reality. About 
these events, according to a wide-spread opinion, it was difficult to achieve firm 
knowledge, and poets are often accused of making up a story because of this lack 
of precise knowledge. This does not imply that the basic truth of the existence of 
gods and heroes is being denied. 12 The absence of a term for 'myth' may be due to 
the elusive nature of the phenomena in question. It may in fact be an encouraging 
sign of the serious status of the tale. We need then not be alarmed by this lack of a 
native vocabulary for what we would call 'myth; since there may still be phenom-
ena that should be distinguished systematically from discursive and argumentative 
speech. This does not mean that we are returning to a primitive or irrational man, 
only that we are trying to understand tales, that for the Greeks in fact were 'the 
truth; from an exterior perspective. 
Calame however has split his objections to the concept of'myth' into an ethical 
and an intellectual part: 
10 Calame 1988:9; Calame 1991:181; Calame 1999:122, 131f. 
11 Calame 1991; Calame 1996a:39. We meet expressions as '£pya, npri~Et<;, deeds of our forefa-
thers' as well, e.g. Isoc., Paneg. 59, Panath. 151, who chooses to begin his account at a more 
remote time (noppro1:£pro6£v 120) referring to 'npri~ct<; 7tEp't niiv npoy6vrov,' when presenting 
events at the time of Theseus (175). Dem. Epit.lx [1391] 'nolclca Kat Kalca 1it£7tpri~avw,' with 
the example of the battle against the Amazons (8), '<aKEivrov £pya' (9). In this context Dem-
osthenes uses the expression 'ounro /-lE/-lU6olc6yrrtat' as a parallel to being recorded in epic, that 
is 'not yet being recorded in poetic form,' distinguishing the deeds of the younger generations by 
the criterion of having taken place in a more recent age ''imoyuo'nEp' dvat 'tOt<; xp6vot<;' (9). On 
the question of native terminology see also Burkert 1979a:3 n.l4. Lincoln 1997 focuses on the 
dynamic character of terms like 'logos' and 'mythos' and the way intellectuals strategically used 
one or the other to further their cause. 
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'If we abandon the 'essentialist' connotations of the category which we perhaps 
naively construct as 'myth; then we restore to the narrative manifestations of sym-
12 E.g. Hesiod uses 'logos' for his tale about the primordial races (Hes. Op. 106), Pindaros contrasts 
the true 'logos' about Pelops with embellished 'muthoi' Pi. 01. i:28f., Herodotos contrasting the 
historical epochs dividing king Minos (to us a figure of myth) and Polykrates, the ruler of Samos 
about 530 BC, tells that the latter lived 'in the human age. Tii<; o£ av8pW1tT\tll<; A£yo~.U~VT\<; 
yEvET\<;' (Hdt. iii:122). The distinction seems to correspond to our distinction between prehis-
tory and history. The historian Thoukydides is of the same conviction. 'We know by report that 
Minos was the most ancient person to acquire a naval power (Mivw<; yap naA.aitmo<; wv aKoii 
t<J~Ev vaunKov EKtijaato' Thuc. i:4, 1). He apologises for having presented a record which lacks 
'tO ~uewliE<;, 'the myth-like, poetically embellished? element,' (for the negative connotations in 
Isokrates see Papillon 1996:16), and therefore may be less attractive to the listener than truthful 
( 'outE ... E7tt to npoaaywy6tEpov tii aKpoaan i\ aA.T18E<JtEpov' Thuc. i:21,1 cf i:22,4, where 
Thoukydides applies the term 'ayrovta~a,' which Sifakis 1997-98:27 translates as 'a piece for 
public performance in the immediate future; or, a composition to be presently performed in 
public'). However, he does not doubt the historicity of the Trojan war (Thuc. i: 3,3). Diodorus 
from Sicily, writing in the age of Augustus, discusses the difficulties of those who are composing 
ancient (hi)stories (Diod. Sic. iv:l, ta<; naA.ata<; ~ueoA.oyia<;), due to the fact that 'the antiquity 
of that which is to be recorded makes it difficult to find out about them ( lj ~£v yap t&v avaypa-
<!Jo~Evwv apxm6tll<; OU<JEUpEtO<; ouaa 1tOAAftV anopi.av napEXE'tat 'tOt<; ypa<!Jouatv), and 
causes much confusion to those who are writing, and the record of the dates (xp6vwv) not 
admitting of the most accurate proof causes the readers of the (hi)story ( ti'\<; i.atopi.a<;) to feel 
contempt [for it]. In addition the variety and the multitude of the heroes and demi-gods and the 
other men to be presented in genealogies makes the record difficult to arrive at. But the greatest 
and most baffling circumstance is the fact that those who have written down the most ancient 
events and stories (<a<; apxawta<a<; npa~Et<; tE Kat JlU8oA.oyia<;) are in disagreement among 
each other. For that reason the writers of greatest esteem among the later historians (\.ampto-
ypa<!Jwv) have given up the ancient record (ti'\<; ~£v apxaia<; ~ueoA.oyi.a<;) due to the difficulty 
[of the task] and undertaken to write about more recent events (ta<; 0£ VEWtEpa<; npa~n<;)'. 
Plato (Resp. 382c,d) underscores the fact that our knowledge of the gods and heroes (t&v naA.-
at&v) is imperfect (Kat EV al<; vuvo+t EAEYO~EV tat<; ~ueoA.oyiat<;, Ota tO ~Tt EiliEvat 01t1J taA.-
118£<; EXEt 1tEpt tWV naA.at&v, a<!Jo~OtoUVtE<; t<\i CtAT\8Et tO 'lfEUOO<; Ott ~aA.tata, OUt(!) XPTJ<Jt~OV 
notou~Ev ... ).Discussing (Resp. 377de) the nature of false tales (~ueou<; ... 'lfEUOEt<;), and the 
way people report badly or shamefully (KaKw<;) about the gods and heroes, Plato (or Sokrates) 
uses the simile of a painter who does not succeed in drawing a proper likeness of his model, 
(W<J7tEP ypa<!Jdl<; ~T\OEV EOtKO'ta ypa<!Jwv ol<; av o~ota ~OUAT\8ii ypa'lfat) implying the existence 
of the model. Cf Belfiore 1985:50, who argues that Platon primarily is concerned not with the 
factual deeds ascribed to the gods (about whom we do not know the truth), but with their nature 
(about which we know that it is nothing but good). Elsewhere Plato (or Sokrates Leg. 966c) 
argues 'Isn't it one of the most honourable things ( KaA.A.iatwv) to know about the gods ... that 
they exist and what power they prove to possess as so far as a human being is in a position to 
know these things' (ffi<; Eiai.v 'tE Kat O<JT\<; <Pai.vovtat KUptot ouva~EW<;, EtOEVat tE El<; O<JOV 
ouvm6v E<Jtt v taut' avepwnov ytyvro<JKEtV). Aristotle discussing the subject matter of tragedy 
(which for us belongs to the realm of Greek myth) states that the tragic poet should keep to this 
material, which he considers to belong to the realm of historical events ( t&v YEVOJ.!EVWV 
6vo~atwv Poet. 1451b15 ff.), cf Veyne 1983.76f. (= 1988). Censorinus (De natali 21 Jahn) citing 
Varro, refers to the three epochs of history, the 'ali11A.ov' (the undemonstrable), the ·~u8tK6v' 
(mythical/recorded in epic?) and the '\.moptK6v' (historical/recorded in genealigies etc.?). For a 
survey of Greek criticism of myth see e.g. Dowden 1992:Ch. 3 'Greeks on Myth,' 9-53. 
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bolic thought their multiplicity of functions-among them, an argumentative and 
then a rational one' (emphasis added)Y 
When Calame suggests that we should abandon the essentialist connotations of 
'myth' so as to include e.g. the argumentative and rational functions (the '"prag-
matic" that is the rhetorical function' Calame 1999:136f.) of'narrative manifesta-
tions of symbolic thought; he proposes to solve the problem while still clinging to 
some concrete tales ('narrative manifestations') or their nucleus.14 This is to pro-
pose that we should study the appearance and functions of some concrete tales, 
which we 'perhaps naively' have identified as myths or symbolic thought according 
to our common sense, or interest, 15 a suggestion Calame may have adopted from 
Claude Levi-Strauss, who stated 'un mythe est pers:u comme mythe par tout lect-
eur dans le monde entier' (Claude Levi-Strauss 1958:232, Traube 1986:82) This 
seems all well, except for the fact that in principle the question of identification is 
the fundamental one. Calame's statement thus leaves open the problem what he 
means by the expression 'symbolic thought.' We cannot impressionistically single 
out some narratives without accounting for their inclusion into this category of 
'symbolic thought.' My approach will be the opposite one, starting from a study of 
some 'mythical' or symbolic properties in order to identify tales (and other phe-
nomena) that correspond to these criteria, whether they have been included into 
the category of 'Greek myth' or not. As will become clear, I will argue for the view 
that there are phenomena whose essence and functions are radically different from 
argumentative and rational thought. 
Instead of denying the existence of'myth' as Calame and Detienne do, we should 
acknowledge its ubiquitous existence, among the scandalous natives as well as among 
ourselves. I would thus suggest that we analyse Detienne's and Calame's propo-
sition as two questions: whether particular tales labelled by us as 'myth' in fact are 
manifestations of the 'symbolic' phenomenon that will be defined as such, and 
whether there exists a particular 'mythical thought, pensee mythique, mythisches 
Denken, pensiero mitico; a fact that is denied as well by Calame and Detienne. 16 
The present article is oriented by the thought that 'myth' or symbolic phenom-
ena in general are universal, neither to be ashamed of nor to be despised, suspected 
or abolished. 17 In addition, being an elusive phenomenon, 'myth' is-and here I 
13 Calame 1996b:23. 
14 Cf Calame 1986:138 'une structure syntaxique nucleaire.' 
15 Calame 1988: 1lf. 'sens commun,"recits passionnants.' 
16 Calame1988:10 ' ... croire a !'existence d'une pensee mythique specifique, c'est poursuivre le 
fantome rousseauiste de l'Age d'or du prelogique.' Cf Calame's paper at the Myth into Logos?-
conference in Bristol 1996b, 1999:140. During the discussions at this conference the same was 
indeed generally denied. Cf the contrary view in Perrin and Pouillon 1988. 
17 Traube 1986. 
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anticipate some of my conclusions-effective as long as it is not recognised as 
such. 18 As soon as a 'myth' is 'revealed' as 'myth,' it ceases to be 'the truth,' the nat-
ural way of being and doing, the undiscussed and unquestioned. It is therefore 
hard to detect our own 'truths,' and all the more the more fundamental they are. 
Myth and 'truth' are complementary concepts, the same tale seen from the outside 
and the inside respectively. 
There is a special reason for classicists to address the question of'myth,' because 
of the still wide-spread idea that the ancient Greeks in fact abolished 'muthos,' sub-
stituting 'logos' for this 'naive mere telling of tales.' While the Greek version of'log-
os' may be uniquely Greek, I assume that rationality is as universal a human faculty 
as is 'myth.' 19 There are thus several reasons for studying the nature of'myth' in or-
der to disentangle the term from everyday or prejudiced meanings and to clarify 
the concept as a scholarly tool of investigation. 
At this stage I would signal two dangers that lie in our path: unawareness of our 
role as observers may distort our observation, and unreflected choice of scientific 
metaphors may impede our understanding. One example are terms of intellectual 
faculties, such as 'mythical or symbolic thought,' and I would suggest, that (perhaps 
a decisive) part of the difficulties that have arisen in our quest for the nature of 
myth may be due to a choice of descriptive terminology. A result of this terminol-
ogy (or its cause) is that it virtually focuses upon the scholarly activity of observa-
tion, documenting and description, and its concomitant thinking. It 
imperceptibly exchanges the experience of the observer for the workings of the ob-
ject of study in its living context. Another example is the terminology which draws 
its metaphors from the sphere of physics or from the visual arts. The very term 
'l'imaginaire,' for example, suggests some static picture on a wall. Images of paint-
ing on canvas or a framework freeze the living tale into a substance passively ab-
sorbing the ideological system, a kind of knowledge which thus can be deciphered 
in its texture.20 This prompts us to investigate the 'meaning' of a myth. 
18 Cf Jean-Pierre Vernant, cited by Ellinger 1984:22. 
19 Edward Sapir, who was familiar with native Amerindian cultures, firmly states: 'Anyone who has 
been in contact with natives knows, [unless he is so devoted to his prejudices as to pay no heed to 
his observations,] that the pre-logical mind does not exist in them. [At least, it does not exist in 
them more than in ourselves.] Modern man is just as illogical as primitive man in many 
respects-politics for example. The only difference [between primitive man and ourselves lies 
not in the processes of thinking but in the fact that ] we appeal to more sophisticated supernatu-
ral beings [and that we have accumulated a larger store of technical knowledge]' (Sapir 
1994:211). 
20 Calame 1988:148 '[une definition semantique] dessine l'arriere-fond ideologique sur lequel se 
detache Ia narration,' 'Et cette etude du cadre culture! donnant un sens et organisant en un sys-
teme les valeurs actualisees par Ia narration devrait etre menee pour chaque recit du corps ... ' 
( 149). We might prefer 'symbolic tone' referring to the field of music. 
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On the other hand, in attempts at defining myth or classifying tales the readily 
observable, reasonably enough, has been at the centre of interest. In order to cap-
ture some verifiable, that is commonly perceptible, features we have skipped the 
question whether the essence of'myth' does yield to the demand for easily percep-
tible data. These have been assumed to be either semantic elements or a particular 
literary form or genre, which would constitute the basis for its definition, and 
prompted the search for some general narrative formula or plot structure.21 Kirk's 
energetic denial of the existence of some general form and function of myth is 
mostly due to this empirical approach, the demand that there should emerge some 
common denominator identifiable in the texts under scrutiny, preferably particu-
lar personae and plots. Or there should be found testimonia on ritual staging for 
all mythical stories. And when no such evidence was found it was concluded that 
no common feature is to be found. 
However, our situation as observers is a problematic one. Firstly, being con-
fronted with a complex phenomenon as 'myth; there is always the difficulty of 
drawing a boundary between the object of study and one's own observation and 
we may risk making statements about ourselves rather than our object. For exam-
ple, when discussing Ernst Cassirer's view of an 'association of myth with religion, 
... the assumption that both involve a passionate response to the world ... ,' Kirk 
dismisses this possibility with the argument that ' ... in hundreds of other myths 
[other than Gilgamesh and Genesis(!)] whether oral or literate, no special intensity 
is detectable' (emphasis added). 22 When analysing the different functions of tradi-
tional tales, what Kirk describes as the properties of these tales, is very much what 
to him is readily observable and his (intellectual) reactions to the texts.23 
Secondly, as historians we have the duty to verify our statements by evidence, 
and we do not have access to anything else than a piece of flat paper, which mani-
fests itself as a wall or a picture, corresponding to the 'wall' on which we attach our 
scholarly comments. Still we should remain aware of the fact that this is not the 
real object. To deny some 'mythical' entity or properties on the basis of the material 
conditions of our sources (and the observer's reactions to that) is like making 
statements on the behaviour of animals from a photograph. We as classical philol-
ogists are not witnessing living tales, not the vibrant telling situation (nor are we 
the recipients).24 
21 Calame 1988:9. 
22 Kirk 1970:30£. 
23 Kirk 1970:253ff. 'The first type is primarily narrative and entertaining; the second operative, 
iterative, and validatory; and the third speculative and explanatory ... myths [that] belong to the 
second type-they glorify famous leaders ... .' 
24 By way of contrast see the model investigation by Geertz 197 4. 
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Traditional tales are to be studied in their living environment, their 'mythical' 
quality may be that special feeling in the members of the audience then and there, 
something withdrawn from our library observation. At this stage I would remind 
of the fact that tales, whatever their genre, are not only received at the intellectual 
level, they rouse emotions as well, which should be included in an interpretation. 
The problem I have signalled, then, may be the dilemma of'the empirical scientist, 
who limits his area of inquiry to those data which are verifiable by empirically test-
able methods,' while anthropological research uses several explanatory models be-
yond pure description. 25 
In particular when studying the elusive category of 'myth,' what really matters 
is the natives' reception, their experience, their reactions to the tale.26 This recep-
tion includes their culturally structured perception of the world, a structure which 
has of course been studied extensively. But structure being again an abstraction, it 
answers primarily the observer's need for order, while not exhaustively accounting 
for the participants' experience and active creation of structure. The fact that we 
are studying phenomena which belong to the past, deprives us, of course, of having 
direct access to their affective aspects, this most important source of our study. 
Hence we have reasons for being pessimistic in identifying and interpreting 'myth.' 
However, emotions are also moulded into sentiments, in different ways according 
to genre, 'prescribed emotions' constitute part of the meaning of tales in perform-
ance. What we may hope for, then, is to detect some of the vestiges of this mould-
ing, and reconstruct the event in a holistic approach. 
Yet another problem with identifying and interpreting 'myths' by readily ob-
servable properties is that it ignores the fact that tales may'aim' at telling and doing 
something else than what they profess to do. They may in fact attract attention to 
some superficial elements while leading attention away from the essential mean-
ing, a question to which I will return. 
One of the crucial criteria of symbolic phenomena then is to be found in their 
reception. These phenomena cannot be studied without taking into consideration 
the effect upon the audience. What we would need is a direct access to the complete 
setting and a thorough knowledge of the particular culture, which would give us 
the means of distinguishing between the overt purposes of the performance and 
the hidden cultural meaning. This would in addition make us more sensitive to 
our own culturally conditioned perceptions and professional habits. Instead of de-
scribing some intrinsic 'meaning' of the tale (possibly our own response), we 
25 Saliba 1976:100f. See below. 
26 Cf Geertz' ( 1976) concept of 'experience-near' as opposed to 'experience-distant' description in 
anthropological fieldwork, which he illustrates with the distinction between the concepts 'fear' 
and 'phobia' respectively. 
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should inquire into the effects upon 'them,' and instead of thinking in static imagery 
or purely intellectual categories, we should apply metaphors from human activity: 
symbolic 'workings.' 
Myths and 'myth' 
In spite of these problems, however, I will still argue for the view that at an abstract 
level there does exist some common denominator to our object of study. When we 
have abolished the notion of some primitive man contrasting with our enlightened 
Western humanity, as well as abandoned the search for some commonly observa-
ble kind of tale, there still may be something we could call 'myth.' A general cause 
of much misunderstanding in the field of our study is the fact that we are familiar 
with the concept of 'Greek mythology,' The Greek Myths being a corpus of tales ex-
pressed in different kinds of literature and visual arts, the tales of particular indi-
viduals as Odysseus, Oidipous, Helene, Medeia and so forth. Understood in this 
sense, the definition of 'myth' is clear and simple, a group of identifyable tales, 
which by corollary we consider as historically and otherwise 'untrue.' But while we 
can readily determine whether a tale was part of the corpus of'Greek myths' or not, 
we have great difficulty in answering the question, what kind of phenomena 
'myths' are, and in giving one single definition. This is due, of course, to the fact 
that we start with catching all kinds of fish into our net, only to conclude that there 
does not exist any unified kind of Fish. 
The problem is found in the synchronic and in the diachronic dimension. First 
there is the problem of overlapping. Certainly there does exist a wealth of studies 
about the different functions and properties of (Greek) myths, including the ef-
forts by Geoffrey Kirk, Walter Burkert, and their followers, but there are also a 
number of studies noticing that 'mythical' properties (Timaginaire' or 'perceptual 
schemata') might be found in other, contemporary, tales as well, e.g. the historical 
writings ofHerodotos, Ploutarkhos and others (e.g. Jean-Pierre Vernant, Pierre Vi-
dal-Naquet and their followers, Claude Calame, and Christiane Sourvinou-In-
wood). The suspicion that 'mythical' functions may be found in 'logic' discourse, 
that is, historiographical, philosophical and other scientific writings, creates con-
fusion about the concept of'myth.' The categories of'Greek myths' and 'mythical' 
texts may thus partly overlap, partly constitute different fields. 
The other source of confusion lies in the transmission of traditional tales to 
new environments, the fact that 'Greek myths' have been told in other contexts and 
ages than their original, where they do not serve the same function. This circum-
stance has prompted e.g. Jan Bremmer to peel off parts of the definition of myth 
proposed by Burkert. 27 In his view the tale does little more than provide the com-
27 Bremmer 1987. 
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munity with a focus of identity.28 When found outside the Greek cultural commu-
nity, e.g. among the Romans, the mythical tale perhaps is neither old, traditional, 
nor meaningful. In short, what we so readily acknowledge as 'Greek myths' can 
cease to be 'mythical' in the sense of definitions proposed for this kind of tales. 
These dilemmas of inclusion and exclusion make it difficult to define 'myth,' and 
when we start from the surface of the traditional tales found in Greece or the Near 
East, the problem of definition becomes acute. 
The problem we are witnessing may be reduced, of course, if we reserve the 
(everyday) term 'myths' to a particular kind of tale that is easily recognisable as 
such e.g. by their names and basic plots, 'Greek myth,' 'Near Eastern myth,' 'Nordic 
myth' and so fort. Such tales belong to a corpus commonly identifiable as originat-
ing within a particular group, and thus, geographical area and age. We have, then, 
to consider other types of tales, which some of the scholars mentioned have singled 
out as instances of'l'imaginaire' or 'cultural concepts.'29 
We should, then, avoid the term 'myth' outside the body of tales we identify as 
a group's 'traditional tales.' When studying the workings of these and other tales, 
we may instead refer to 'symbolic phenomena' with its anthropological sense, and 
study their properties. This has two advantages: we may study the workings of a 
particular tale or class of tales in a particular place and time, and its incorporation 
into a certain rite, without suggesting that the tale as such always works in that way. 
In addition, we may recognise similar workings in tales other than those belonging 
to the body of 'traditional tales,' thereby getting a more precise insight into the 
processes at work and a closer view of what has been recognised as the difference 
between 'mythos' and 'logos.' What I have provisionally labelled 'myth(ical)' I pre-
fer to call 'symbolic phenomenon.' 
Recognising then that the well-known 'myths/traditional tales' are not co-ex-
tensive with 'symbolic phenomena' and that non-traditional tales are not always 
just rational accounts,30 we may suggest a term 'symbolic tales' in order to collect 
those forms of verbal expression that seem to manifest 'symbolic workings.' 31 A 
parallel distinction would be found in cultural imagery and other collective ex-
pressions. 
We may assume also that this 'symbolic quality' is not inherent in the narrative 
itself, but an aspect of narrative in performance and activated in the audience at a 
particular moment, who creates and enjoys its workings. This implies that the 
28 Bremmer 1987:5. 
29 See the next section. 
30 Of course the category of individual poetic creation is a third category, which does not interest 
us at the moment. 
31 By selecting this term I would stress the active and creative aspects of symbolic phenomena. 
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symbolic quality may be vivid or fade away, be revived and extinguished, and so, 
briefly speaking, I would distinguish 'hot' and 'cold' myths, e.g. those (traditional) 
tales which are told in cultural performance and those that cease to be so. Their 
symbolic focus may move from one accent to another, creating new patterns and 
changing experiences. I envisage a rather manifold body of (traditional) tales, with 
complex ways of telling, shifting from rational 'logos' to symbolic workings and 
back again. 
It may well be that the mythos-logos distinction does not yield a clear-cut di-
vision between kinds of tales (texts), but rather constitutes an abstraction separat-
ing strands within a text, which I would prefer to label 'symbolic' and 'discursive' 
respectively. Hence I would preliminarily propose that we assume that tales move 
along the poles of a continuous range of expressions, the 'symbolic workings' man-
ifesting themselves in different ways and at different points and moments of the 
tale. 
Our next task will of course be to identify and analyse these processes. I will 
presently return to the concept of 'symbolic phenomena,' and account for expres-
sions as 'performance,' 'workings,' and 'aim.' For the moment I think it useful to 
recapitulate some of the theoretical reflection that has been devoted to the concept 
of'myth' within our field of classical studies. 
The definition of'myth' within classical studies 
As Kirk so eloquently has shown, 'myths' stage a wide range of drama tis personae, 
and can have been put into a number of services, so as to defy any definition of 
function, 32 the result being that he vigorously rejects any unified definition of 
'myth,' although he does not deny the existence of (kinds of) 'myths.' The only sin-
gle definition he can accept is that 'Myths are at the very least tales that have been 
passed down from generation to generation, that have become traditional.'33 
However, as we saw, tales staging 'mythical' personalities are not always of an-
cient date, some may demonstrably be new creations, the development of the The-
seus myth being a clear example.34 Since mythical tales may be modified in rather 
radical ways, ironically enough, even the minimal definition accepted by Kirk, 'a 
traditional tale,' may be inadequate as well. The only definition of'myth' we are left 
with is 'a tale,' unless we save Kirk's definition by noticing the permanence of tra-
ditional names of the heroes in an in some other respects new tale. 
We should try, then, to approach the problem of definition by starting with the ex-
istence of 'traditional tales,' that is, tales which not necessarily are of ancient date 
32 Kirk 1970:253f.; 197 4:18. 
33 Kirk 1970:282; 1974:27. 
34 Bremmer 1987:3f. 
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or transmitted over the generations, but which are accepted by a group and sur-
rounded with special care. Often they will refer to the remote past, which lends 
them authority. 35 Discussing the most influential definitions that have been pro-
posed I will suggest some further precision leading to the question of the nature 
and substance of the phenomena involved. 'Myth' has been defined as: 
- traditional tale (Kirk),36 a narrative, which is not necessarily very old (Brem-
mer),37 but at least transmitted by a group (Burkert),38 
-independent of any particular text (Burkert, Graf),39 
-carrying an aura of truth ('Verbindtlichkeit'), 40by appearing in the guise of a 
record of the past, hence e.g. anonymous, lacking an author, but rooted in 
time and space ( Graf), 41 
-without immediate reference (Burkert),42 not referring to empirical reality, but 
shaping it, either by offering 
- programs of action, plot/motifemes (Burkert/Graf with reference to Propp )43 
founded on basic biological or social programs of action, 
-i.e. guiding ritual processes44 usually exaggerating the patterns of ritual practice 
(Bremmer, Versnel),45 or 
-systems of classification and systems of ordering social life (Vernant),46 creating 
boundaries, defining 'the other' (Hartog et al. )47 
-sometimes by creating inversion (Vidal-Naquet, Burkert et al.)48 
35 Alternatives may be 'dream time' or the future. 
36 Kirk 1970:282, 1974:27 
37 Bremmer 1987:3. 
38 Burkert 1979a:2. Burkert is followed by Nagy 1990:8. 
39 Burkert 1979a:5 'the identity of a traditional tale, including myth, independent as it is from any 
particular text or language and from direct reference to reality.' Graf 1987:8 'Der Mythos ist nicht 
der aktuelle Dichtertext, sondern transzendiert ihn: er ist der Stoff, ein in graBen Ziigen festge-
legter Handlingsablauf mit ebenso festen Personen, den der individuelle Dichter nur in Grenzen 
variieren kann,' cf Graf 1996. 
40 Graf 1987:9f. 
41 Graf 1987:8f. 
42 Burkert 1979a:3 
43 Burkert 1979a:18, Burkert 1979b, Burkert 1981. q Graf, 1987:56. 
44 Burkert 1979b:29, Versnel 1993a, reviving jane E. Harrison's term pari passu; cf Burkert 
1980:175. 
45 Bremmer 1984, 1978; Versnel1993b. 
46 E.g. Vernant 1974. 
47 Hartog 1980. 
48 E.g. Vidal-Naquet 1983, 1986; Burkert 1970. 
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- signs/perceptual schemata, structuring, stylising and filtering the perception of 
reality (Calame, Sourvinou-Inwood),49 creating and conveying means of 
apprehending reality, 
-collective metaphors, generated by a concatenation of categories (Scheid and Sven-
bro),so 
- referring to something of collective importance, 'angewandte Erzahlung' (Burk-
ert), 51 the collective property of a community or group, which recognises it 
as 'our tale' and to which it is meaningful, referring to a supra-individual re-
ality, 'le "savoir partage" (Scheid and Svenbro), 52 a living tale, rooted in a 
particular historical environment and formed by its audience to be culturally 
meaningful (Brelich), 53 
-offering a focus of identity (Bremmer)and Dowden, 54 
-justifYing institutions such as family, clan, city or tribe (Burkert, Dowden and 
others),55 
49 Calame 1982; Sourvinou-Inwood 1988a 'conceptual schemata;' Sourvinou-Inwood 1991:4, 'con-
ceptual universe.' 
50 Scheid and Svenbro 1994:9 'Si, dans le sous-titre, le mot "mythe" nous a semble preferable a 
"metaphore," c'est que Ia metaphore que nous etudions dans ce livre est une metaphore partagee 
- faisant partie de ce qu'on appelle courramment le "savoir partage" et non pas une creation 
individuelle.' Cf their difficulty in distinguishing myth from other symbolic phenomena, 'C'est 
en effet en pensant a ces difficultes que no us avons etes amenes a voir dans le mythe non pas un 
recit, mais une simple concatenation de categories. Concatenation grace a laquelle il devient pos-
sible, a l'interieur d'une culture donnee, d'engendrer des recits mythiques, des images et des rit-
uels dans le champs qui sont leur propres. Envisage ainsi, le rapport entre le recit, !'image et le 
rituel, desormis a egalite entre eux, ne serait done pas celui d'un reflet speculaire mais d'une 
parente, donnant aux documents respectifs un air de famille, dont l'origine est cette concatena-
tion de categories que nous appellons mythe'(lO). 'Ce qui veut dire, en bref, que le mythe, dans 
une culture donnee, est une 'proposition' simple, generatrice de recits, d'images et de ritu-
els'(ll). 
51 Burkert 1979a:23, 26 ff. Cf Burkert 1979b:29. He is followed by Nagy 1990:8. 
52 Scheid and Svenbro 1994:9. 
53 Brelich 1977. 
54 Bremmer 1987:5, Dowden 1992. 
55 Burkert 1979a:29, "'Wirklichkeiten," iiber die mythisch, d.h. in Form von Erzahlung gesprochen 
wird, sind zunachst soziale Ordnungen, Institutionen und Anspriiche von Familie, Clan, Stadt 
und Stamm.' Dowden 1992: 7 4-92 Ch. 5 'Myth and identity.' Blake Tyrell and Brown 1991:6 pro-
pose the following definition ot Greek myth 'a tale rooted in Greek culture that recounts a sequence 
of events chosen by the maker of the tale to accomodate his own medium and purpose and to achieve 
particular effects in his audience. As narratives that both exemplify and shape [Greek] culture, 
myths are words in action' (emphasis in the original). Konstan 1991 attempts to characterise the 
substance of Greek mythology concluding that it preferred homogenous anthropomorphism 
against hybridisation, rational events and individual characterisation. All these I think are ques-
tionable proposistions. There are a number of hybrids, fantastical events, tale types and charac-
ter stereotypes in Greek mythology. 
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- sometimes a religious expression, a tale drawing the sensibilities of a religious 
congregation towards its magnetic centre (many). 
Sometimes 'traditional tales' seem to support social norms and values by explicit 
moralising, Calame's 'argumentative and rational functions.' Presently I would 
consider them as 'Greek myths' employed in a didactic way, that is, being part of a 
deliberate rhetorical strategy. With this distinction I foreshadow the following dis-
cussion, in which I will emphasise the non-verbalised( -able?) aspects of'symbolic 
phenomena.' Another function of traditional tales may be their strategic use in or-
der to establish legitimacy (e.g. Herodotos Hist. 9:27).56 A particular kind may be 
the creation of heroes with their 'biography' and the establishment of a grave cult 
as a pervasive culture-creating tendency, which can be found throughout history 
up to our age and culture, according to Pierre Vidal-Naquet.57 
The properties of'myth' thus far presented have found wide acceptance among 
classical scholars. However, they may be considered within a general view and ob-
servations from religious studies and modern field anthropology. 
Concepts and theories from modern anthropology 
In other fields than classical studies the definition of myth has been difficult to ar-
rive at too.58 To Eliade myth has been a 'paradigmatic model of what happened in 
the original past ... a primordial event,' legitimising the present, and characterised 
by a basic pattern, a pattern in which opposite and contrary realities and state-
ments are united harmoniously ... a coincidentia oppositorum.'59 However, the 
concept of'myth' is most often given a far broader content and different attributes 
within anthropology. It is noticed that tales, which are identified as 'myth,' can 
present a wide range of themes, and can be owned by different social groups. These 
tales cannot be taken at their face value. The functions of'myth' may be variously 
assessed, from unifying device, explanation of natural phenomena, justification of 
authority, power and status to inversion and expressions of conflict. 'Myth, how-
ever, is never a complete replica or reflection of a people's culture and it may con-
tain exaggerated and inverted features of real life ... And not all myths represent a 
harmonious unity of social life; some, on the contrary, can be ... expressing and 
not solving social-psychological conflicts of a particular social structure or of cer-
tain distributions of power within society.'60 Mythological accounts are not always 
56 Connor 1970. The creative and spontaneous use of collective patterns in political action has been 
studied for several periods. Examples are Connor 1987, Strauss 1985. 
57 See the interesting study on the phenomenon, 'Des dieux, des rois, des heros et des saints;Vidal-
Naquet 1993. 
58 Cf Saliba 1976:72ff. for this brief overview of the situation. 
59 Saliba 1976:4f. Eliade is followed by Hubner 1985. 
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taken seriously by their audience and the degree of belief may vary. Not all societies 
seem to have a mythology, nor do myths necessarily refer to the past. Myths may 
point to the future as do millenarian tales. And the tales may present 'a lawless, 
asexual or promiscuous condition; that is, the scandalous world as observed by 
Detienne's mythographers. 61 
Within these studies the concept of'symbolic phenomena'62 or 'symbolism' has 
a firm tradition,63 where it often refers to ritual. It seems, however, that much of 
what is said about symbolic behaviour, rites and so forth, includes traditional tales 
as well.64 The distinction between rites and myths (and icons) is not an essential 
one, but sometimes useful for practical purposes, helpful only as seen from the ob-
server's perspective. In terms of their origin and function they are inseparable: tra-
ditional tales, ritual behaviour, traditional images and physical arrangements.65 
The fact that the expression 'traditional' has been widely accepted may be due 
to a tendency of tales to be presented as 'our tradition.' However, as we have seen, 
this does not necessarily require factual age, and it may be helpful, with Sally 
Moore and Barbara Myerhoff to acknowledge this feature of'being handed down' 
as a technique of creating 'the truth.' Studying what they call 'secular rituals,' they 
observe that these ceremonies (including mythical drama and so forth) have a ten-
dency to become 'traditionalizing,'66 that is, these expressions are embedded in 
practices that confer authority on the tale. In the case of ritual, the essential fact is 
not that the practices have virtually been repeated for generations. The ritual proc-
ess itself does not need to be age-old, but its stylised form rather suggests tradition 
by being 'attention-commanding.'67 Historians studying recent historical develop-
60 Saliba 1976:73f. According to Saliba the anthropolical approach embraces '(1) explanation in 
terms of antecedent event or efficient causes; (2) explanation in terms of mediating factors [ ... 
meaning of customs and values in terms of their interrelatedness]; (3) explanation in terms of 
ends or purposes [ ... functional studies]; and (4) explanation in terms of general laws or princi-
ples [ ... sees its object within a larger framework, as pertaining to a class]' (101). 
61 Saliba 1976:126 ff. 
62 With this expression I refer to certain kinds of cultural phenomena that have been subject to 
renewed interest during the last thirty years. Spiro 1969:208 'symbolic anthropology ... the 
ostensibly new field of symbols and symbolism.' 
63 Spiro 1969, Firth 1973. The term 'symbol' has been in use in other research fields as well of 
course, e.g. psychology, Freud 1921, philosophy, Cassirer 1973, linguistics, Sapir 1972-79. 
64 Turner 1969b:8 'the basic unit or "molecule" of human ritual behavior-which contains both 
verbal and non-verbal constituents ... is the ritual symbol.' 
65 Cf the definition of'myth' proposed by Scheid and Svenbro 1994. 
66 Moore and Myerhoff 1977:7 ' ... collective ceremony can traditionalize new material as well as 
perpetuate old traditions. Some of its formal properties mimic its message in this regard.' 
67 Moore and Myerhoff 1977:8 'In acting, stylization and presentional staging, ritual is attention-
commanding.' 
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ments also realise that invention plays a role in 'mass-producing traditions.' As 
Hobsbawm concludes, 'traditions' which appear or claim to be old are often quite 
recent in origin and sometimes invented.'68 The essence of'tradition: then, is not 
necessarily age, but the circumstance that the tale (rite, image) is institutionalised, 
and surrounded by collective care, creating a magnetic centre upon which people 
spontaneously lavish their emotional and material resources.69 Traditions belong 
to the general category of cultural symbols, they share their properties of being 
emotionally charged and comprising multiple meanings, which make them par-
ticularly flexible instruments of creating culture. 70 In fact it is especially in times 
when society is being rapidly transformed that the need is felt for 'invented tradi-
tion of a novel type for quite novel purposes.'71 We have to return to these proper-
ties in more detail. 
Not only do symbolic tales tend to be enveloped in a 'traditionalising' atmos-
phere, they are, by definition held in a concrete form. 72 A symbolic tale stages a 
presentation of concrete personae rather than uttering abstract propositions. This 
obvious property of symbolical tales is often passed over in analyses of the phe-
nomenon. We have been so familiar with the explanation that the staging of indi-
vidual fates is due to the 'primitive' nature of myth, that we have overlooked the 
possibility that it may be an essential requirement of the phenomenon. It seems 
necessary to examine this concrete or 'presentational' nature of symbolic tales, as it 
is labelled by Moore and Myerhoff/3 which is opposed to explicit arguing. The 
purpose of the 'presentational' quality is to deflect questioning?4 We can expect 
that symbolic tales may appear as tales from the past, generally being enveloped in 
an aura of factuality, presenting facts of history, but also geography, or general 'na-
ture.' 
Another aspect of symbolic tales is that they may include an 'exegesis,' explana-
tions of the events presented. These exegeses, however, need not offer the real rea-
68 Hobsbawm 1992:9 Their functions include establishing or symbolising cohesion, establishing or 
legitimising institutions, socialisation. 
69 Hobsbawm 1992 stresses the circumstance that traditional histories are in fact not the events 
actually recorded, but those which 'have been selected, pictured, popularised and institutional-
ised by those in function to do so' (13). Giving some examples of the invention of traditions in 
our modern world he notices' ... all invented traditions, so far as possible, use history as a legiti-
mator of action and cement of group cohesion' ( 12). 
70 Hobsbawm1992: 11 'The crucial element seems to have been the invention of emotionally and 
symbolically charged signs of club membership ... Their significance lay precisely in their unde-
fined universality.' 
71 Hobsbawm 1992:6. 
72 Cf Levi-Strauss 1977:61 'logic of the concrete.' 
73 Moore and Myerhoff 1977:7. 
74 Moore and Myerhoff 1977:8 'ritual ... deflects questioning at the time.' Cf Connerton 1989:102. 
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sons. We have to realise that the explanation ('motivation') of a symbolic tale may 
be part of the tale, while the real motives remain hidden. According to Sperber, 'The 
symbolic character of a motivation is not due to the fact that it applies to a symbol, 
it is rather the object that becomes symbolic by virtue of the motivation that is ap-
plied to it ... motivations establish the truth of a statement not by demonstrating 
it but by presupposing it.'75 The meaning offered, as an exegesis, is in fact not the 
real one. This suggestion is related to Pierre Bourdieu's notion of'meconnaissance/ 
misrecognition,' the fact that the real meaning of symbolic expression is dis-
guised. 76 In other words, symbolic expression often serves another aim than that 
which it professes to do. The facts of nature or history, even when being the subject 
of the tale, are not really what is at stake, perhaps not even when they are presented 
in cosmogonic tales. 
Maybe the pervasive criticism and 'correction' of mythical tales in antiquity 
(e.g. the introduction to the first Homeric hymn to Dionysos or Pindaros' First Ol-
ympian Ode, Eur. IA 794) was a necessary part of the system serving a similar pur-
pose. And while disputing which was the correct version of a story, the critic 
presupposed the existence of the mythical hero. According to Paul Veyne 'Le mythe 
etait un sujet de reflexions graves et les Grecs n' en avaient pas encore fini avec lui, 
six siecles apres ce mouvement des Sophistes qu'on dit avoir ete leur Aujklarung. 
Loin d'etre un triomphe de la raison, l'epuration du mythe par le logos est un pro-
gramme tres date, dont l'absurdite surprend ... .' (Veyne 1983:13). 
Thus far we could summarise the properties of 'symbolic tales' into an abbre-
viated definition as 'culture-creating tales.' The epithet is of course too general to 
be very useful, and has to be refined with detailed qualifications. However, with 
this expression we may avoid the passive connotations of 'traditional' as 'the 
present generation ruled by the past' as well as 'the present receiving information 
from the past.' On the contrary, as we have seen, symbolic tales are both highly 
flexible tools, grasped and selectively moulded for strategically shaping concep-
75 Sperber 1975:30f. Cf ' ... the motivation of symbols (of which exegesis is a special case) is not 
metasymbolic, but symbolic (33).' 'Exegesis ... does not constitute interpretation of the symbol, 
but one of its extensions, and must itself be symbolically interpreted' ( 48). Cf Scheid and Sven-
bro 1994:11, '... le mythe, dans une culture donnee, est une 'proposition' simple .. . Et 
d' exegeses, faut- il ajouter.'. Buxton's discussion of the explanations of traditional tales overlooks 
the problem of pseudo-explanations, the fact that the explanation given does not present the real 
issue at stake, it only apparently offers some reason (1994:211). Lloyd 1983:217, studying the 
development of Greek science, argues that science made explicit, what were implicit concerns in 
traditional thought. 
76 Bourdieu 1982:122 ' ... tout rite tend a consacrer ou a legitimer, c'est a dire a faire meconnaitre 
en tant qu'arbitraire et reconnaitre en tant que legitime, naturelle, une limite arbitraire.' Cj 
Bourdieu 1992:81. 
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tions of the present, as well as dynamic forces structuring the cultural senses of in-
dividuals and audiences. 
This latter property I would bring into focus, because I think we are not always 
aware of the complex workings of our material in its original setting. As I suggested 
the scepticism about the existence of a category of'myth' may in part be due to the 
fact that these tales frequently are described within an entirely intellectual ap-
proach. Often symbolic tales are analysed as if they were tales merely conveying ac-
tion patterns or 'classification systems,' this underlying structure being basically a 
non-affective or non-narrative entity. Proponents of this view seem to assume that 
symbolic tales are expressions of some language competence, and just another 
cognitive medium. 77 Hence the surface tale is dispensed with as less interesting, 
and with it the rich moulding of the affective reactions in the audience. 
I would not deny that symbolic tales do shape the cognitive world of the audi-
ence, but we have to be aware of the possibility that these tales do more than just 
order perception. For this reason the surface of the symbolic tale is not irrelevant 
to its meaning. It is basically through the details of the telling that different reac-
tions to the tale are roused, and with them collective sentiments of value are creat-
ed. At this stage already I would suggest that some of the essential workings of 
'symbolic tales' are to be found in the interaction between classificatory ordering 
of perception and the charging with value. The question of the existence of'myth' 
seems thus to be more a question of terminology and focus: by labelling a tale as 
an instance of the 'classification system,' the structure within the tale is equated 
with the mythical tale as such, and hence it does not differ essentially from ordi-
nary speech. By directing the main focus upon deciphering this structure in the 
tale, the tale's total presentation of events is given less attention. But it is through 
the totality of the tale that 'meaning' comes about and cultural elements are 
charged with value. In particular the tale's performance in a concrete social setting 
should, when possible, be given proper attention, the details of the telling and re-
ception. 
The semiotic approach includes both structural and narrative aspects, and may 
be more useful as a common denominator for the cultural element of symbolic 
tales.78 Still both structuralist and semiotic approaches may be too intellectual, in 
that they present their object of study as underlying structures or patterns of 
thought, without accounting extensively for the affective impact of symbolic tales. 
77 Cf Connerton 1989:104. What is lacking, according to Connerton is the notion of'the body as a 
bearer of social meaning' and incorporating practises serving a social mnemonic purpose. Con-
nerton focussing on the importance of 'habit-memory' of bodily processes in the creation of a 
group's collective sense and action. The notion of 'habitus' in Bourdieu 1977 is fundamental 
here. 
78 Sourvinou-lnwood 1991. 
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The approach of Walter Burkert and Fritz Graf is primarily directed towards 
the plot aspect of traditional tales, these being by definition narrative. However, 
they consider 'myths' not to be identical with the surface tale either, but to be 
found embedded as plot structure of an elementary schematic nature, 'Aktionspro-
gramme; e.g. a 'girl's tragedy;79 the 'transgression, punishment'80 scheme, or the 
New Year's 'dissolution and reunion' plot. In practical analyses, however, they pay 
attention to the affective impact of particular episodes.81 What is important is that 
this approach in its definition seriously focuses on the social context of the 'ap-
plied' tale. 
Still I doubt whether this approach sufficiently accounts for the elaborated 
form of traditional tales, their composition as a bounded tale, their often fantastic 
or 'scandalous' content, which appeals to the imaginationand the senses, and 
structures cultural sentiments. 
This point can be illustrated by the following example. If the essense of'myth' 
is to be found exclusively in its plot-structure or motifs, how are we then to ac-
count for tales which offer similar plot schemes, while on the surface being obvi-
ously different? Comparing Euripides' Bakkhai and Aristophanes' Lysistrate 
Daniel Levine observes 'the common plot involves groups of women in rebellion 
against the civil authorities ... retreatto a holy mountain ... [they] defeat their pri-
mary male antagonist, who himself is dressed as a woman ... and dies a ritual 
death:82 Levine assumes then that these two dramas 'with their common themes 
and "women on top" associations, demonstrate an affinity between the genres 
••• :
83 This view precisely misrepresents the distinction between genres and disre-
gards the surface text, which creates completely different meanings. In both dra-
mas women ensnare their male enemy, the first presenting the tragic fate of 
Pentheus, the second the comic degradation of the Athenian magistrate. Although 
one of these dramas obviously did not treat traditional material, both were per-
formed at the public and religious celebration of the Dionysia in classical Athens. 
The theory of an underlying plot structure cannot account for the differences be-
tween these two tales, because it does not take into account the 'prescribed' affec-
tive reactions in the theatre. The object of these dramas was to rouse vastly 
79 Burkert 1979a:7. 
80 Graf 1987:54. 
81 Burkert 1966; Graf 1979; Bremmer 1984; Versnel 1993b and 1993c. 
82 Levine 1987. The tale of the Lemnian women, which in Burkert's interpretation accompanied 
the new year festival at Lemnos, we may assume, was performed in a serious and solemn version 
at this festival. However, we may imagine a version like Aristophanes' Lysistrate, (similarly an 
action of women run wild and getting power over their men) but contrary to the Lemnian ver-
sion evoking outrageous laughter. 
83 Levine 1987:30. He even asks 'Why does no playwright cross the genre boundary?' (36). 
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different responses in the audience, horror and laughter respectively, the tragic 
and comic emotions intended within the two distinct performances. 
In the case of Aristophanes' Lysistrate we can readily assume a 'mundus inver-
sus' scheme, the hilarious situation of a world ruled by women. While this plot 
could have been a seriously subversive utterance of rebellious women, the not so 
subtle parody of female weaknesses in the surface text excludes this option, while 
the opposite, a ridiculous 'women-on-top' scenario supporting the status-quo is 
much more plausible. When we take the context of theatrical and social organisa-
tion into account, all doubt should disappear. A simple analysis of plot-structure 
which does not include the social context, nor the fantastic elaboration of the sur-
face texts is bound to fail in discovering the tale's cultural meaning. The same ap-
plies to the Bakkhai, with its subtle orchestration of the audience's imagination 
and cultural emotions surrounding the central value of Dionysiac cult. Instead of 
ridiculing the 'women on top' scenario, the drama's workings result in sacralising 
this ( cultic) world order, that is, the taboo on male participation, in the service of 
the all-powerful god.84 These compositional, imaginational and affective aspects 
we have to include into our analysis of'symbolic tales.' 
Culture and its workings 
There are however still other aspects to the problem, the question whether and 
how we may separate 'symbolic tales' from general 'cultural processes.' This prob-
lem guides us to the question how cultural patterns and values are created and 
maintained. These are of course conveyed in every day communication, through 
the examples given by others and in the expectations they communicate. But in ad-
dition to this 'routine' maintenance of the culturally ordered world most groups 
are in need of extraordinary means of mobilising common focusing, the festive, 
non-mundane instruments of culture, not seldom resulting in the creation of anti-
order. 
This double nature of what is commonly classified as 'symbols' has been ana-
lysed by Sherry Ortner. She distiguishes between two kinds of'key-symbols, sum-
marizing and elaborating' in the following manner: 'Summarizing symbols are 
primarily objects of attention and cultural respect; they synthesize or "collapse" 
complex experience, and relate the respondent to the grounds of the system as a 
whole. They include most importantly sacred symbols in the traditional sense. 
84 For a detailed analysis see Bouvrie 1997. A shorter version, with iconography Bouvrie 1998. 
Konstan 1991 argues for the distinctively Greek nature of Greek myths, maintaining that Greek 
myths cannot be separated from their poetic medium, e.g. tragedy which focuses on emotional 
and personal content. I am sceptical of this modern conception of tragedy as well as of the 
notion that the myths of other cultures can be understood without listening to the details of the 
telling. 
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Elaborating symbols, on the other hand, are symbols valued for their contribution 
to the ordering or "sorting out" of experience. Within this are symbols valued pri-
marily for the ordering of conceptual experience, i.e. for providing cultural "ori-
entations," and those valued primarily for the ordering of action, i.e. for providing 
cultural "strategies':' ... 'Summarizing symbols in general ... operate to compound 
and synthesize a complex system of ideas, to "symmarize" them under a unitary 
form ... Elaborating symbols, on the other hand, work in the opposite direction, 
providing vehicles for sorting out complex and undifferentiated feelings and ideas 
... they are essentially analytic. Rarely are thes symbols sacred ... :ss Key symbols 
are signaled by several 'indicators: 
( 1) The natives tell us that x is culturally important, 
(2) the natives may seem positively or negatively aroused about x, rather than 
indifferent, 
(3) x comes up in many different contexts. These contexts may be behavioral 
or systemic: x comes up in many different kinds of action situation or conversation 
or x comes up in many different symbolic domains (myth, ritual, art, formal rhet-
oric, etc.), 
( 4) there is greater cultural elaboration surrounding x, e.g. elaboration of vo-
cabulary, or elaboration of details of x's nature, compared with similar phenomena 
in the culture, and 
(5) there are greater cultural restrictions surrounding x, either in sheer number 
of rules, or severity of sanctions regarding its misues:86 
Both the summarising symbols, which synthesise complex experience and 
elaborating symbols which are analytic involve feelings, the first by mobilising 
commitment around complex ideas, the other by sorting feelings and ideas. Sym-
bols, and culture in general are seen as creating 'orientations; i.e. cognitive and af-
fective categories; and 'strategies; i.e. programs for orderly social action in relations 
to culturally defined goals' (emphasis added).87 
Outside the routine maintenance of social norms, and in addition to every 
speech act, which may enforce the rules of society, there are the special occasions 
of 'symbolic speech; that is, tales that are surrounded with special attention and 
which may be designed in order to evoke some culturally prescribed sentiments in 
85 Ortner 1973:1340. Key symbols are public and not necessarily conscious, they point to special 
cultural interests. Key symbols of the summarizing kind are those that demand special commit-
ment, while elaborating symbols serve to direct thought and action with their formal organiza-
tional role. 
86 Ortner 1973:1339 ' ... there may be more indicators even than these of the key status of a symbol 
in a culture, but any of these should be enough to point even the most insensitive fieldworker in 
the right direction.' 
87 Ortner 1973:1340. 
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the minds of the listeners. These tales belong to the wider category of 'public 
events; in Don Handelman's terms, celebrations which are set apart, 'framed; 
from every-day life and acknowledged as such by the community.88 This author fo-
cuses on the way these special events are created and the manner in which they are 
structured. 'Public events' (or ritualized action) are of central importance to a 
group, and different types of social organisation tend to create certain types of rit-
uals,' ... different logics of design in the constitution of public events index social 
orders that themselves are organized in radically different ways.'89 Each of the phe-
nomena identified by Handelman as 'public events' follows a special sequence or 
script with 'formalization of space, time, and behaviour that distinguishes these 
[public occasions] from the living of mundane life.'90 
Victor Turner has contributed to the study of symbolism by pointing to the 
evocative character of symbols. He recognises as a general feature of symbolic phe-
nomena that they mobilise the senses, imagination and emotions of the partici-
pants. In many rituals this is achieved by a wide-spread use of music, song, 
dancing, visual attributes, special costumes and masques, and the use of alcohol, 
incense or other stimulants. During the celebrations he has studied, there is a sim-
ilarly wide-spread tendency to present 'sacra; that is, dramas or tales which refer 
to some basic human experiences, such as the relations between family members, 
sex, birth and death. During the event the senses and emotions of the participants 
are aroused to a higher level of sensitivity, while at the same time messages about 
the basic norms of society are transmitted. The complex stimulation affects the au-
dience's emotional or 'orectic' sensibility, while the implicitly transmitted messag-
es direct themselves at the 'normative' receptivity of the participants. Turner's 
main point here is that the 'exotic' aspects of symbolic phenomena are in fact a 
fundamentally necessary requirement for creating culture, 'Ritual, scholars are 
coming to see, is precisely a mechanism that periodically converts the obligatory 
into the desirable.'91 According to Victor and Edith Turner the 'sacra' enacted in a 
religious celebration not unexpectedly often present the cultural heroes transgress-
ing conventional morality, thereby no doubt eliciting reactions of abhorrence in 
the audience to the ('scandalous'!) tale. In a ludic phase, on the other hand, there 
88 Handelman 1990. 
89 Handelman 1990:7. 
90 Handelman 1990:11. Celebrations which mirror the ideal world are found in powerful bureau-
cratic states, those that shape and model the participants are more common among tribal peo-
ple, and those that re-present, that is 'work on comparison and contrast in relation to social 
realities,' belong to traditional hierachic societies. Here we typically find liminal phenomena, as 
indeterminacy and inversion, the temporally acceptance of anti-structure. Handelman, 1990:66, 
cf idem 1982. 
91 Turner 1967:especially 27-47, 29f.; Cf Turner 1969a, 1969b, 1974, 1992. 
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are activities, which turn the world upside-down and play with the elements of 
culture, producing a 'jocund festivity' in order to revitalise the community, or-in 
times of crisis-to heal a social breach.92 There is thus no question that cultural 
symbols merily mirror the hierarchies and ideal order of the world. Instead, in cel-
ebrations, this world is broken up and transformed in order to achieve definite af-
fective reactions in the participants. As Barbara Babcock argues, societies need 
both order and disorder (1978b ). I will presently return to this aspect. 
We are familiar with the fact that in initiation ceremonies the accompanying 
tale commonly tells of the horrible fate of some young (male) heroes and their 
wanderings outside the civilised world (Bremmer, Calame, Sourvinou-Inwood),93 
or, as Bruce Lincoln suggests interpreting female transition rites (the Persephone 
myth in the Homeric hymn to Demeter included), the tale evokes the cosmic signif-
icance of the (female) hero/initiand.94 Through the evocative force of the tale the 
participants in the rite were transformed in their experience of themselves. And as 
Lincoln underscores, the essential workings of the ritual telling is the transforma-
tion of the people involved.95 
Lincoln has studied the creative and mobilising aspects of symbolic tales, a cat-
egory which he terms 'discourse; together with phenomena as ritual and classifi-
cation. Countering the wide-spread idea that myths are conservative vehicles of 
traditional values, or oppressive to the powerless, he states that there is nothing in-
trinsically reactionary in myth (Lincoln 1983:81 ). He demonstrates through sev-
eral studies that 'discourse can also serve members of subordinate classes to 
demystify, delegitimate, and deconstruct the established norms, institutions and 
discourses that play a role in constructing their subordination.'96 Still Lincoln ob-
serves a general tendency to create myths referring to the remote past as reaction-
ary instruments of power, while myths viewing the future as a construction of an 
ideal world, as is observed in millenary movements. He presents the schematic 
equation (1983:84): 
'Cosmogonia:Escatologia Reazione:Rivoluzione.' 
92 Turner and Turner 1982; Cf Turner 1982 and Turner 1999:577. For an interesting application of 
Turner's models within a classical context see Strauss 1985. 
93 Bremmer 1978:2, Calame 1983; 1990, Sourvinou-lnwood 1979. 
94 Lincoln 1981. 
95 Lincoln, 1981:34 ' ... using symbolic action, transforming the individuals involved, endowing 
mundane existence with some grander meaning, and reaffirming the abstract values of society at 
large.' Cf 'I view ritual as a coherent set of symbolic actions that has a real, transformative, effect 
on the individuals and social groups' (6). 
96 Lincoln 1989:5. Cf Lincoln 1985. 
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Above all stressing the imperative and dynamic force of the phenomenon Lincoln 
warns against conceiving of myths as just 'reflections' of or 'comments' upon soci-
ety (1983:79). 
Within cultural performance studies stressing the importance of the socially 
created context, it is generally assumed that the social interaction between per-
formers and audiences has the capacity to transform, not simply reflect social life. 
Felicia Hughes-Freeland studying modern performative genres focuses on 'the ac-
tive roles which militate against the notion of the audience as passive recipients of 
a clear communication.' In the terms of Edward Schieffelin 'performance deals 
with actions more than text: with habits of the body more than with the structures 
of symbols, with illocutory rather than propositional force, with the social con-
struction of reality rather than its representation;97 
Studies of the 'performance' of symbolic expression suggests that this model-
ling of emotions is an important part of the events. The (unconsciously) orches-
trated sentiments in cultural performances are studied in macro-celebrations as 
the present-day Olympic games by John MacAloon.98 These special occasions 
clearly demonstrate that the modulation of sentiments is an important aspect of 
these collective events.99 
Handelman is especially interested in the way these public performances are 
structured, that is, the 'orchestration of experience and affect, the moods, states, 
emotions and sentiments of participants and on-lookers.' 100 This aspect of public 
events has also been given special attention by Bruce Kapferer, who points to the 
fact that there may be sequences of expected sentiments which are evoked in ritu-
als where the powers of the universe are dramatised, and the techniques by which 
the audiences are guided through a programme of reactions, may vary from seri-
ous to hilarious. We have thus reason to be attentive to this modulation of cultural 
sentiments. The dynamic character of certain ritual phenomena is brought out in 
a number of studies, e.g. the transformation of the participants through special 
'symbolic types,' in particular the ritual clown. According to Kapferer' ... the anal-
ysis of ritual as form, particularly in relation to how it effects important transfor-
mations of the contexts of meaning and action cannot be satisfactorily achieved 
without considering the process of its performance .... [Ritual] is not simply the 
presentation of symbolic objects and actions in highly stereotyped and redudant 
97 Hughes-Freeland 1998:15, Schieffelin 1998:194. Cf Bauman and Briggs 1990:59-69. 
98 MacAloon 1984. He analyses the different moods dominating the various genres of rite, game, 
festival, and spectacle: sollemnity, joy, fun, awe, and so forth. 
99 Cf Fernandez 1974:123 ' ... society is not only a system of interlocking categories, but an ebb and 
flow of emotion.' 
1 00 Handelman 1990: lf. 
SYNN0VE DES BOUVRIE 
form, the dramatic revelation of myth, the expression of cultural ideas and princi-
ples, the marking out of some inexorable cultural logic and so on. Ritual moves 
participants, it organises their emotions and experience, it questions those taken-
for-granted elements of cultural life and holds them up for inspection. We have of-
ten been reduced to the consideration of ritual as conforming to a set of semantic 
rules, or as being organised in accordance with linguistic principles. This may be 
so, but ritual derives its efficacy and power from its performance and it is in its per-
formance that its work of transformation fails or succeeds.' 101 
The capacity of symbols to mobilise people into collective action is due to their 
complex affective-cognitive nature. Lincoln in fact supports the general view that 
'society is constructed from nothing so much as from sentiments.' 102 Symbolic 
phenomena, then, do not only involve the conceptual ordering of the participants' 
world, their cognitive function, a primary aim is to mould the emotional reactions 
of single participants. Abner Cohen even maintains that symbolic action is essen-
tial to the preservation of the self. 'The contractual element is subversive of self-
hood, the symbolic element is recreative of selfhood. It is in the symbolic act that 
we continually create and recreate our selfhood, the totality of our person' (123 
emphasis in the original). 103 Following Turner he argues that 'the norms, values, 
principles and rules [of society] are abstract and remote and their mere perception 
by the person is not sufficient to induce him to action. It is only when a person is 
emotionally agitated by the sensory pole of the symbol that he will be moved by 
action' (121). Clifford Geertz reminds us of the fact that 'not only ideas, but emo-
tions too, are cultural artefacts.' 104 
Inversion 
The cultural device that is especially responsible for moulding the participants' 
sentiments in symbolic processes is the inversion of the normal order. 105 We are so 
familiar with this phenomenon at we might lose out of sight that the most impor-
tant aspect is its emotional quality. 
101 Kapferer 1984b:6. Cf Kapferer 1984a, Handelman and Kapferer 1980. 
102 Lincoln 1989:20. Turner 1969b:12 analysing the operational dimension of symbols, what partic-
ipants do with them, includes their 'affective quality ... , whether they are "aggressive;' "sad," 
"joyful;' "penitent;' "derisive," and so forth, in terms of the given culture's standarized interpre-
tations of these expressive acts.' 
103 Cohen 1977, cf Pinxten 1991. 
104 Geertz 1973:81. 
105 Babcock 1978b. Objectively and from an intellectual point of view this phenomenon is often 
labelled incongruence. 
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Inversions are part of the festive and ritual practices as opposed to normal be-
haviour. According to Barbara Babcock, the tendency to dissolve the normal sys-
tems of signification and to create a state of disorder answers a fundamental 
human urge and belongs to the realm of 'ritual' as contrasted with 'normal and 
ceremonial discourse.' 106 She observes that in normal (and ceremonial) communi-
cation there is complementarity between signifier and signified. 'In contrast, ritual 
communication involves both an extremely economical and extremely inflated re-
lation of signifiers to signifieds.' During these practices man may create phenom-
ena with disproportionate relationships between signifier and of signified, 
resulting in a surplus of signifiers or a multitude of signifieds. In the first case, ver-
itable 'fireworks' are created, 'as pure pattern and pure possibility, ... a symbol of 
revolution, it is itself a revolution in, a suspension of serious and normal modes of 
signification' (Zoe. cit.). 107 In contrast to these carnivalesque results, the second al-
ternative creates 'the multi-signified of serious ritual communication' (Zoe. cit.). 
As Babcock observes 'Ritual events as well as distinct phases or sequences with-
in a given event are initially marked or framed by a bracketing of ordinary signifi-
cation. In one of two ways-by literally denying and stripping away or by 
multiplying to the point of indeterminate nonsense-we suspend customary 
meanings: by fasting or feasting, by sexual abstinence or sexual licence, by naked-
ness or by costumes of motley, by immobility or excessive movement, by seclusion 
or public display; by silence or noise.' (l978b:297). 
'While bracketing through excess is more frequently the means of framing lu-
dic or antistructural rituals or ritual phases, and denial more generally indicative 
of the serious and the structural, such is not always the case: priests wear costumes 
as well as clowns. Whatever the initial frame, ritual sequences that are essentially 
serious and iterative of structure are ordering and orderly. This means that the rna-
106 'A surplus of signifiers, then, creates a self-transgressive discourse which mocks and subverts the 
monological arrogance of "official" systems of signification. The bantering anti-signified of car-
nivalesque discourse is an insult both to the complementarity of ordinary speech and to the 
multi-signified of serious ritual communication. It is also a statement in praise of and as a dem-
onstration of the creative potential of human signification as opposed to its instrumental and 
representative use' (Babcock !978b:296) 
107 'By playing with the ways in which words and objects and actions signifY in normal and ceremo-
nial discourse, discourse by means of a surplus of signifiers paradoxically both questions and 
reaffirms social, cultural, and cosmological orders of things. While a superfluity of signifiers is 
predominant and self-evident in ludic or carnivalesque ritual, I would suggest that all rituals 
involve a dialogue or alternation between these two modes of signification-multi-signifier and 
multi-signified-both of which differ from our daily, ordinary use of signs. In contrast to the 
complementarity between signifier and signified characteristic of normal discourse, ritual com-
munication involves both an extremely economical and extremely inflated relation of signifiers 
to signifieds' (lac. cit.). 
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jority of signs-verbal and nonverbal-are polysemic or multisignified and that 
they are hierarchically arranged, the dominant or central symbols marked by ex-
treme multivocality (297) . 
In contrast, those rituals or phases of ritual which focus on the ambigious and 
inhibited aspects of the social order, or which invert, contradict, or otherwise chal-
lenge structure, are disorderly and disordering. Antistructural sequences are likely 
to be ungrammatical and indeterminate, and this indeterminacy is expressed pri-
marliy, though not exclusively, through an excess of"floating signifiers'" (297). In 
ritual, society "takes cognizance of itself" and communicates its major classifica-
tions and categories both through ordering them and through disordering them-
by overdetermining and by rendering indeterminate customary processes of signi-
fications. Ritual, then, involves not only the enactment and transmission of the ul-
timate sacred propositions, but also the exposure of the ultimately significant to 
the devastating play of nonsense. This paradox inherent in ritual is significant.' 
(298). 
What I think particularly interesting is the fact that inversion can be created 
with different means and varying effects. The comic topsy-turvy world of fantasy 
is a well known device of rousing laughter, it is at the core of carnival and has burst 
forth spontaneously in many times and places. I would call attention to the way in-
version may operate along a tragic as well as a comic axis. 
It may be less generally accepted that the world of disaster may generate inver-
sions of a gloomy kind. In fact tales of the terrible chaos, which once upon a time 
disrupted the order of the world, bringing barbarian invasions, revolution of the 
lower classes, parricide and sterility, are not uncommon in oriental texts, as has 
been demonstrated by S. Luria, who labels them tales of'die triibe Zeit.' However, 
often these tales are contrasted by visions of a paradise-like condition, when the 
poor rise to power and the earth provides peace and abundance, 'eine selige 
Gliickzeit.' 108 Tales of the age of Kronos or Saturnus, as Hendrik Versnel has ar-
gued, confront a time of chaos and disaster with a paradise-like age of peace and 
happiness. 109 No doubt such tales belong to this category of gloom vs. peace-and-
abundance tales. Even if the tale offers an outrageous violation of norms, it may be 
beneficient to the audience and result in the creation of culture. 110 
108 Luria 1929. Cf Auffarth 1991. 
109 Versnel1993b and 1993c respectively. 
110 This effect could be compared with the emotions noticed by Nancy Munn in her detailed analy-
sis of the emotional effects of symbolic expression upon the participants in initiation rite and 
myth (Munn 1969:199). 'Thus the body destruction experiences connected with the individual 
and pre-social forms of power are converted into experiences of bodily well-being and strength 
through the operation of the ritual upon the myth.' 
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In a somewhat different way Greek tragedy seems to offer this kind of tale, stag-
ing a primordial time when the world was newly ordered. In the course of the 
mythical events this fundamental order is disrupted, to the 'shock and horror' of 
the audience. The Attic theatrical performances with their impressive lyrical and 
imaginative poetry evoked the metaphysical world of living gods and heroes and 
worked upon the cultural reflexes of the participants. This precludes any notion of 
a quasi-philosophic drama, as is so often assumed, when terms as 'discourse,' 'di-
dactic function' and so forth are applied. 111 
The foundation of these notions of tragic drama may be a result of projection 
on the part of the investigator, who 'observes' his own intellectual processes in the 
object. Jean-Pierre Vernant argues that the tragic protagonists were perceived by 
the audience as persons stemming from a distant age, while the chorus voiced the 
attitudes of contemporary Athens. 112 Vernant's basic notion of Attic tragedy as-
sumes a 'dual relationship with myth. In the tragic conflict, the hero, the king, and 
the tyrant certainly still appear committed to the heroic and mythical tradition, 
but the solution to the drama escapes them. It is never provided by the hero on his 
own; it always expresses the triumph of the collective values imposed by the new 
democratic city-state.' 113 N.T. Croally argues for tragedy's 'didactic function.' Fol-
lowing Vernant the author maintains 'In the democracy, the widening of the fran-
chise was more extreme, the right to speak openly more acceptable, and the 
politicization of discourse more complete. Tragedy was such a discourse.' 114 This 
last sentence is no more than an a priori statement. Similarly Christian Meier as-
sumes a political forum of debate, offering rhetorical questions rather than argu-
ments: 'Fragen iiber Fragen muBten sich auftun, die man kaum vor der 
Volksversammlung erortern konnte ... Konnte da die Trag odie einspringen? ... 
Brauch ten sie [die Griechen] die Tragodie vielleicht auch, urn Distanz zum All tag 
zu gewinnnen, Ausgleich, Klarheit-und ein Offenhalten der Grundlagen ihres 
Lebens: brauchten sie sie zu deren Weiterbildung?' 115 
In this question of interpretation we as scholars, belonging to a generation 
which saw the fundamental challenging of .academic and political authority, are 
111 E.g. Vernant in Vernant and Vidal Naquet 1986:22 'A travers le jeu des dialogues, Ia confrontation 
des protagonistes avec le chceur, les renversements de situation au fil du drame, le heros legen-
daire, chante en gloire par l'epopee, devient sur Ia scene du theatre !'objet d'un debat. Quand le 
heros est mis en question devant le public, c'est l'homme grec qui, en ce v siecle athenien, dans 
et par le spectacle tragique, se decouvre lui-meme problematique;' cf 'ie "discours ambigu" 
d'Ajax' (13). 
112 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1972: 'Preface,' cf 11-17. 
113 Vernant and Vidal-Naquet Zoe. cit. 
114 Croally 1994;11, 2. 
115 Meier 1988:9f. 
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most easily in danger of projecting our own habits of exploring, challenging, ques-
tioning, and probing, into our object of study, expecting the Attic dramatists to do 
the same. In addition we seriously neglect the fundamental difference between this 
ritual theatre and our own, 'aesthetic; theatre as I would call it, which we are com-
pletely free to visit. 116 Here, in spite of our involvement in the action we essentially 
keep an aesthetic distance to the events presented and as an audience we are ex-
pected to perceive a conscious message conveyed in the drama. Our attitude to-
wards art in general is emphatically individualistic and our age of rapid change one 
of self-examination and self-reflexivity. According to David Napier 'we live in a 
constant state of self-definition, in which reflection, for all that this word means, 
is not only a desirable state but a moral imperative' (emphasis in the original). 117 
Interpretations of Greek tragedy often assume that this mythical story telling 
was exploring our inner ambiguities and paradoxes. However, interpreting tragic 
drama as the presentation of'moral ambiguities,' 118 reveals an intellectual and aes-
thetic or 'flat' understanding of tragedy, like observing a document, a piece of pa-
per and discounting the specific tragic effect in its original audience. The 
(unquestioned) notion that tragedy stages ambiguity stems from Vernant too, and 
is found in e.g. the work of Simon Goldhill. Referring to the Bakkhai Goldhill ob-
serves 'Dionysos' sphere would seem to encompass precisely the sense of paradox 
.... The tragic texts seem designed to leave an audience with a question (as often 
116 Schechner 1983:137 (Schechner's distinction between ritual and theatre corresponds to my 
ritual theatre vs. aesthetic theatre): 
'EFFICACY < > ENTERTAINMENT 
Ritual 
results 
links to an absent Other 
abolishes time 
brings the Other here 
Theatre 
fun 
only for those here 
symbolic time emphasizes now 
audience is the Other 
performer possessed, in trance performer knows what he is doing 
audience participates audience watches 
audience believes audience appreciates 
criticism is forbidden criticism is encouraged 
collective creativity individual creativity.' 
Furthermore Schechner caracterises our modern theatre as a performance in which psychologi-
cal means are prominent and authenticity (in the sense of ritual efficacy) is lacking, 'This use of 
psychology is a reflection of our preoccupation with the individual .... In a society as large and 
wealthy as ours only aesthetic theatre is possible' (136), in contrast to among other theatre forms 
classical Athenian drama (127, 139). Schieffelin 1998:202f. maintains that popular assumptions 
about the nature of the relationship between theatre audience and performers are ethnocentric 
and should not be extended to cultural performances in other cultures. 
117 Napier 1992:32. Cf the extremely individualistic and intellectualistic approach by Croally 1994. 
118 Cf Buxton 1994:197 ' ... in tragedy expression is given to the rich moral ambiguities latent in the 
bare narratives about some of the heroes.' 
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as not about the legitimation of social positions). It is here in the potential under-
mining of a secure and stable sense of norm ... that the most unsettling thrust of 
tragedy may be located' (emphasis in the original). 1 19 
Again our perception of the artist as somebody radically separated from society 
and 'declaring his exclusion from the masses' is a modern notion. According to Na-
pier our expectations of the artist are shaped by 'the [modern] desire for individual 
discovery and the romantic passion for the socially disenfranchised.' 120 So perhaps 
we should allow the ancient dramatists to cooperate with their community in cre-
ating the basic values of their society. 
We should beware of interpreting this ritual theatre in individualistic psycho-
logical terms too. When Greek culture does present 'the other' this is not in oppo-
sition to 'the self,' that is 'me,' but to 'us, our normal world order, our valuable way 
of being and doing; the cultural dimension of the self. Nor is the intended emo-
tional effect of tragedy to be identified with the individual's reaction, which varied 
according to the various personalities in the audience, as Richard Buxton asserts. 
Speaking about myths in general, he states ' ... the chief and in my view unsur-
mountable difficulty for unitarians, especially those panpsychists who deal in uni-
versa! symbols, lies in the extraordinary plurality of tones on offer in Greek 
mythology .... No explanation of a single emotional effect or a single psychologi-
cal function can hope to cover the fantastic aesthetic variety of these tales.' 121 
While I would not deny the empirical fact of individual diversity and the plu-
rality of personal responses, I maintain that it was an important aspect of tragic 
'myths' that they prescribed the specifically stylised tragic sentiments, just as com-
edy prescribed reactions of laughter. These assumptions are not mysterious or re-
ductionist. Folk-tales and other traditional genres work upon different sentiments, 
and we have to take these intended reactions into account because they are part of 
the meaning of the tale. According to Hassan El-Shamy' ... the affective compo-
nents oflore must be examined first as learned "sentiments"' before seeking expla-
nations in biologically based "emotions" (e.g. psychoanalytic interpretations)' (El-
Shamy 1997: 233). 
Old comedy, being an instance of the modulation of the audience's reactions, 
staged the liberation from hierachies and social constraints, from disturbing ele-
ments and anxieties, in a joyous celebration of vitality, incorporated in the invin-
cible hero, marriage (gamos), feasting and plenty (komos). 
We are familiar with this idea that comedy aimed at provoking various kinds of 
laughter. In the same way tragedy aimed at provoking tragic shock and horror as 
119 Goldhill 1990:128. 
120 Napier 1992:31, 21. 
121 Buxton 1994:216f. 
42 SYNN0VE DES BOUVRIE 
well as 'katharsis.' This ritual theatre, I suggest, was not just staging'myths,' (cf. Ver-
nant's apodictic 'les tragedies, bien entendu, ne sont pas des mythes' 122 ) it was a 
'myth; that is, a living symbolic performance of traditional as well as ludic tales in-
volving the participants in a collective experience. It drew them into its Dionysiac 
trance modulating their reactions through tragic shock and comic jubilation, 
while in the course of satyr drama slightly detaching the audience from the myth-
ical world. 123 As such it modulated the audience's distance towards the dramatic 
events. Ritual theatre may flow between close experience of the metaphysical pow-
ers as being present and consciousness of a fictitious world. 124 
It is meaningful to think of tragic and comic theatre in ancient Athens as pre-
senting traditional or ludic personae on stage and engaging the audience in horri-
ble or ridiculous events, which, according to Aristotle eventually lead to 'katharsis; 
a release of a definite kind. As I have argued elsewhere, tragic drama did not 
present problems to reflect upon or philosophical theses. It invaded the cultural 
reflexes of the audience with the horrifying violation (the tragic 'inversion') of the 
normal order of social institutions, sometimes followed by their 'restoration.' By 
presenting these violations of the world order the theatre performance engaged the 
audience in revitalising their cultural sentiments to these institutions. 125 The 
Helene e.g. does not stage the heroine's reflection or suffering, but the objective vi-
olation of the institution of marriage, in particular the respectability and fidelity 
of the wife, the union of the marital couple, and the installation in their proper 
oikos. All these elements are initially threatened or violated. In the course of the ac-
tion all violations are dissolved and the drama ends in a joyous 'restoration' of the 
world order. 126 The Trojan Women does not make a statement about the horrors of 
war and the suffering of civilians. The drama invaded the audience with a horrible 
inversion of the normal order, when the 'warrior' is present defending wife and 
children. 
I will maintain, then, that Greek tragedy was 'mythical and symbolic' in a com-
plex sense. Firstly it staged versions of the traditional tales. And secondly it created 
a tragic process guiding the audience through a horrific violation of their cultural 
senses of normality, validity and value, operating in a symbolic process. In other 
celebrations no doubt different reactions were expected, and the imagination and 
emotions were moulded in other ways. We are familiar with the 'iambic; that is, 
122 'Tragedies are not, of course, myths; Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1988:7. 
123 Bouvrie 1993a; cf Aronen 1992. 
124 See the discussion of Yoruba tradition in Nigeria by Giitrick 1993, 'Edungun apidan-rituell 
teater.' 
125 Bouvrie 1988, 1990a, 1993b. 
126 Bouvrie 1990a, 289-313; cf Bouvrie 1991. 
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contemptive mood of lyrical forms, a genre embedded in sympotic culture, the 
'encomic' mood of victory odes, and other examples may be found. 
Literature and 'myth' 
With these examples I have addressed the distinction that is usually made between 
'myth' and 'literature; with the connotations 'primitive' and 'sophisticated', a dis-
tinction, I think, convenient to modern developments rather than accounting for 
the Ancient world or other pre-modern societies. Our notion ofliterature does in-
fluence our perception of myth in general, and this is why frequently a boundary 
is established between myth, that is, oral telling and 'literature.' 127 Vernant, while 
drawing the distinction between oral and literary myth, still stresses the social role 
of these literary works. 128 
One necessary condition for separating between primitive and advanced liter-
ary forms is the idea that 'primitive' societies do not foster outstanding artists, a 
view I think is fundamentally biased ( Cf BMCR review of Calame by Michael 
Clarke, 18.12.2000). Another underlying idea is the notion of the poet dissenting 
with the traditional outlook of his society, a view I already have called into ques-
tion. We should accept the idea that the great works of ancient literature may be 
'mythical' in the sense of working through symbolic processes in their community. 
Another distinction is seen between genuine and not-genuine religious texts. 
'Real' myths are coached in a religious atmosphere. According to Veyne 'la mythol-
ogie grecque, dont la liaison avec la religion etait des plus laches, n'a pas ete au fond 
autre chose qu'un genre litteraire tres populaire.' 129 Of course here modern notions 
of genuine religious expression influence our view. However we should not sepa-
rate genres according to what we would think fit in a religious service and what 
not. The range of such expressions and sentiments may be much wider in other so-
cieties than our own. This is not to deny the differences noticed in epigraphical 
and literary expressions of the divine, as has been noticed by Harvey Yunis and Jon 
Mikalson. 130 While written texts in Greek tradition may fall short of what we con-
sider to be religious expression (the existence of liturgic texts, other than hymns 
and prayers, is doubtful), or lack the tone of epigraphical sources, they may still be 
symbolic in nature. 
127 An example of this perception is 'the literary reworkings of myth.' Zaidman and Pantel1992: 143. 
128 Vernant 1990:24f. 'L'activite litteraire, qui prolongue et modifie, par le recours a l'ecriture, une 
tradition tres ancienne de poesie orale, occupe dans Ia vie social et spirituelle de Ia Grece une 
place centrale. II ne s'agit pas d'un simple divertissement personnel, d'un luxe reserve a une elite 
savante, mais d'une veritable institution faisant office de memoire social, d'un instrument de 
conservation et de communication du savoir dont le role est decisif.' 
129 Veyne 1983:28. 
130 Yunis 1988; Mikalson 1991. 
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Andre Lardinois envisages 'the possibility that our cherished distinction be-
tween "myth" and "logos," which is now often interpreted historically, is in fact a 
reflection of a generic distinction between narrative poetry, like epics or tragedy, 
and a didactic tradition based on speeches and reason.' 131 What Lardinois has no-
ticed, is the difference between 'myths' as didactic and as a non-didactic (tradi-
tional) tales. In Lardinois' analysis 'real'(?) myth does not operate in a didactic 
explicit mode, it just tells the story which mirrors a world, in the hero learns 
through suffering. 132 
Lardinois' observations are interesting since they demonstrate a growing 
awareness of the fleeting nature of the boundary between 'myth' (traditional tale) 
and 'logos,' of the implicit meanings of'symbolic tales,' as well as of the complexity 
of the genres under discussion. Now we whould beware of uncritically assuming 
that the workings reside in the way the hero learns from suffering, which I think is 
a modern protestant idea, or that the audience learned something of the kind. The 
focusing on suffering seems to me to reflect our modern Western notion of the indi-
vidual's responsibility. Such a view of the nature of 'mythical' tales situates the au-
dience again in a position of reflection, at a modern and aesthetic distance from 
the events presented, and passively receiving the poet's message. We should instead 
consider the symbolic aspect of the epic work as a constant crossing of cultural 
boundaries, thereby conveying its implicit message. The Odyssey guided its audi-
ence through a disrupted world of the oikos, gradually restoring this world to its 
proper order. 133 
The Iliad, in my view, offers a similar development as the Odyssey, revitalising 
the notions of heroic existence as opposed to the non-heroic, in a way dealing with 
the conditions of survival for the polis. 134 Starting with a disruption of the proper 
honour of 'the ideal warrior; in the violent quarrel between the central hero and 
his opponent which demolishes his status, the fundamental elements and values of 
131 'Myth versus Logos. A Generic contest between Homer and Hesiod?' (Lardinois 1996:11). Lardi-
nois suggests that 'Homer's Iliad and Odyssey are essentially myths with a lot of speeches; 
Hesiod's Works and Days is a speech with some myths ... this generic difference comprises a dif-
ferent outlook on life, which prefigures the later opposition between "myth" and "logos." In 
Hesiod, myths are used as paradeigmata to further the argument ... ' while 'there are didactic 
speeches in Homer, for example Phoenix's speech in Book Nine of the Iliad, ... but speeches are 
shown to be ineffective: 
132 'In Homer, on the other hand, myth is the main course and neither the Iliad nor the Odyssey is 
ostensibly didactic ... they rather contemplate the world, which is viewed as essentially tragic .... 
The epic hero, like his tragic counterpart, does not learn from speeches, but from suffering and it 
is suffering (naeru.wm) which are recorded in the myth' (Lardinois 1996:11). 
133 Cf Vidal-Naquet's analysis of the Odyssey (Vidal-Naquet 1983a = 1986a). 
134 As Marylin Arthur has shown the Iliad crosses the boundaries between male vs. female worlds 
(Arthur 1981). 
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this central symbol in Greek society are charged with value. While the plot carries 
the audience through the concrete fates of Akhilleus, (Diomedes), and Hektor, the 
heroes become interchangeable in the symbolic progress of the tale violating and 
restoring this symbol of the 'superior warrior.' By withdrawing from battle his val-
ue as a warrior is emphasised, the situation in a sense bringing the war to a 'stand-
still; creating an ebb and flow between the armies without any decisive result. It is 
this to and fro between succes and defeat which highlights the value of the (absent) 
warrior (Diomedes seeming to constitute a pervasive positive background). 
By returning and gaining renewed recognition in positive action the hero con-
firms his status. This status as paramount warrior being connected with the con-
dition of an early death is opposed to the status of inferior warriors, who will die 
in old age. In other sequences the emphasis is laid upon other aspects of'the ideal 
warrior; his function as a defender of the polis being visualised in the person of 
Hektor. The deadly earnest of this task is underscored by the foreshadowing of the 
hero's as well as the city's doom. It is not by accident that Akhilleus' and Hektor's 
death are conditioned upon each other. At the dramatic level their fates are inter-
connected, at the symbolic level the two concrete manifestations of the warrior 
symbol are fused. While the Akhaian hero does not die himself within the scope of 
the tale, 'the ideal warrior' does in the person of Hektor, attracting all the praise 
and lamenting he deserves as a heroic defender of the city. 
The Iliad does not teach in a conscious reflective way, the audience was pro-
voked in its cultural reflexes, it first experienced an outrageous 'inversion' of the 
world order in the symbol of 'the superior warrior.' Subsequently it witnessed the 
abundant honour and kleos lavished on the 'hero' after his death. While at its dra-
matic level perhaps offering a tragic (in the sense of undeserved) suffering, at the 
symbolic level the Iliad parades a violation and the positive 'restoration' of the war-
rior's value. Just as the Odyssey offers the violation of heroic existence at the oikos 
(at Ithaka) and the various defective worlds (in Odysseus' narrative) leading to the 
'restoration' of the oikos and the world order, to the initial horror and subsequent 
comforting of the audience. 135 
Here the issue of the nature of oral vs. written literature may be raised once 
more. However, whether a tale was conceived in an oral or literate mode does not 
seem to be the crucial distinction within our context, and the question should 
therefore be reformulated, I think, into emphasising the reception of the tale. In 
this respect we should keep in mind Burkert's concept of'eine angewandte Erzah-
lung.' Not the mode of production of the tale is decisive, but the way it is received 
as an important, exciting, or horrifying story, drawing the audience towards its 
magnetic center. 
135 Vidal-Naquet 1983a = 1986a). 
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Traditional tales vs. non-traditional tales 
In this discussion too I would consider briefly the Greek idealistic-romantic novel, 
a genre belonging definitely to a literary age (although it may have been read aloud 
to the audience of a household).136 While these tales do not present traditional 
mythical heroes, there may still be reasons to ask how the Greek novels relate to the 
categories of 'myth' and symbolic tale? The lack of traditional material is a feature 
the novel shares with New comedy. Still both genres present a fascination with a 
fundamental Greek preoccupation: chastity. This virtue, which first and foremost 
applies to females, is in some of the novels a virtue of the male hero as well, and it 
seems to me that this fascination amounts to what we may call a cultural or key 
symbol. This value complex guarantees the citizen-body in maintaining its exclu-
sive privileges within the confines of the family and citizen group. The pervasive 
fascination with chastity, which is typical of all these novels, creates the obstacles 
and denouements of the tale. The norm of marital fidelity is central even when it 
seems to be broken. 
In Khariton's novel the heroine cannot remain faithful to her husband, while 
she is captured and sold to another husband. Still it is significant that Kallirhoe 
bears a child which is without any doubt her original husband's, and in this way 
the tale is signalling the crucial function of fidelity, being the clue to identifying fa-
therhood. 
The fascination with the motif of marital fidelity and female chastity, which is 
so dominant in the novel, is also important in tragic drama, as well as in New com-
edy. In New comedy chastity is challenged but restored, when the heroine is recog-
nized and rescued as a born citizen. In tragic as well as comic plots the legitimacy 
of offspring may be at stake, (e.g. in Euripides' Ion). Tragedy stages males while 
comedy generally highlights females. As I have argued elsewhere, these central as-
pects of the oikos institution were the symbols revitalized in the ritual theatre, and 
I would suggest, this was the case in the novel too, although in a different man-
ner.137 Unlike Ben Edwin Perry, who interprets the novel as an escapist genre, 138 I 
will suggest that the Hellenistic novel served a symbolic aim in uniting the Hellenic 
communities in their dispersed existence throughout a foreign world. The genre 
as a whole may tell us something about the audience's need for preserving their 
Hellenic identity through a narrative abundant in signs of Hellenism, literature, 
religion and so forth. Far from being just a form of entertainment the novel em-
phatically brings the Hellenic world to the forefront, and draws its audience to-
136 Hagg 1994. 
137 Cf Bouvrie 1988, 1990a 1991, 1993b. 
138 Perry 1967:36ff. 
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wards the perennial fascination of the legitimacy of offspring. The peculiar detail 
of male chastity and fidelity, as demonstrated in the figure of Theagenes (in Heli-
odoros' novel), in particular, but also in Khariton's Khaireas, may be interpreted 
as part of the general fascination with boundary-building. Female chastity created 
the boundary between legitimate offspring and bastards in the oikos, as well as be-
tween citizens and not-citizens in the polis, guaranteeing the social order within 
the Hellenic world. The male-chastity-motif may be due to similar symbolic pres-
sure. A phantasy of males remaining faithful to their (faithful) Hellenic wives (or 
a pseudo-Hellenic ideal-world wife in the person ofKharikleia), demarcates Greek 
from non-Greek, preserving the purity of the group, its 'chastity' and cultural 'en-
dogamy.'139 While these assumptions must remain speculative, I would suggest 
that the occurrence of'symbolic tales' may be widespread and manifest themselves 
at unexpected moments. 
As has been argued earlier, traditional tales (myth) and symbolic phenomena 
are not isomorphic categories. Traditional tales may cease to be symbolic, to draw 
the audience towards their magnetic centre, and new, fictitious, tales may become 
charged with symbolic power. Nor are symbolic tales always neatly separable from 
discursive speech. This may be the reason why Calame wishes to include 'the argu-
mentative and rational functions' in his definition of'myth,' while, likewise, Lin-
coln includes argumentative elements in his definition of 'discourse' (closely 
related to symbolic phenomena). In the wide sense ascribed to it by Lincoln, 'dis-
course is not only an instrument of persuasion, operating along rational (or pseu-
do-rational) and moral (or pseudo-moral) lines, but it is also an instrument of 
sentiment evocation.' 140 This argumentative activity may however rest on a non-
argued for basis, some premiss which is taken for granted, hence his qualification 
'pseudo-rational; a phenomenon I would identify as symbolic workings. 
I suspect that symbolic 'pressure' can emerge in the course of argumentative 
discourse, as traditional tales can be employed in arguing and moralising, that is, 
in a rational mode of thinking. We should not thus distinguish 'myth' (in the sense 
of specific tales) and history, according to our criteria of miraculous/factual or ir-
rational/rational, (and improper,'scandalous'/proper). This distinction is not the 
important and interesting one. What is really at stake, is the nature of symbolic 
workings in contrast to arguing and moralising, that is with its appeal to conscious 
judgement and decision making. 
We may then conceive of the appearance and workings of symbolism in a com-
plex and fluid manner, as is the case with Herodotean historiography, where the 
139 Bouvrie 1992. 
140 Calame 1996b, Lincoln 1989:8; cf ' ... it is through ... ideological persuasion and sentiment evo-
cation that discourse holds the capacity to shape and reshape society' (9). 
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symbolic ordering of the world along an axis of Greek normality/otherness imper-
ceptibly protrudes in a rational account of foreign cultures. 141 The rational ac-
count of historical events, conditions and customs reaches at times a symbolic 
cadence, gathering the Hellenic audience in a synchronised vibration of cultural 
awe when Herodotos' reports of foreign peoples amount to transgressions across 
the Hellenic sense of naturalness and honour. 
One may wonder in what way this symbolic pressure on 'otherness' differs 
from that emerging in the mythical presentation of Aiskhylos' Prometheus. In this 
drama the world is mapped out in the descriptions of Io's wanderings in an orbit 
around Argos, the normally ordered world whence Io has departed. In Prometh-
eus' prophecy Io's wanderings operate like a radar mapping on its screen all distur-
bancies and abnormalties, regions which do not know agriculture or xenia, nor 
marriage, that is, representing sub-human forms of life. Scyths do not know how 
to plow, Khalybes and Amazons violate other forms of normal life. In the second 
drama, it seems from the fragments, Herakles' exploits were foretold in a similar 
way presenting, however, the super-human forms of existence found among the 
righteous Gabioi, law-abiding Scythians, Hesperids, and god-fearing and long-liv-
ing Hyperboreans. 142 
Not only traditional and non-traditional, (non-mythical) tales then may man-
ifest symbolic pressure, explicitly rational arguments may do so as well, as the 
studies of Herodotean historiography have demonstrated. And, it seems, so may 
even philosophic discourse. We may e.g. wonder whether the philosophical work 
of Aristotle manifests symbolic elements, when, in his account of the Spartan 
state's degeneration (Arist. Pol. 2, 1269B 12ff.), he implies the evil effects of female 
economic rights for the development of the polis. This record shows features of the 
'myth of matriarchy; tales which tell of the desastrous effects of women's rule in 
primordial time. 143 This kind of myths justifies the subordination of women ever 
after. 144 An example is the myth of Kekrops (which is found in Augustin us De civ-
itate Dei 8:9) telling how the Athenians restrained their women after the whole 
population had voted for a patron deity and women being in the majority chose 
Athena, thereby causing Poseidon to flood the territory of Attika. 
141 Hartog 1980; Rosellini and Said 1978. Vidal-Naquet signals a similar tendency in Diodoros Sicu-
lus (Vidal-Naquet 1991:xxii). 
142 Bouvrie 1993b:213f.; Bouvrie 1996:1. 
143 Bouvrie 1990b. 
144 Zeitlin 1978 ~ 1984, citing Bamberger 1974. 
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How should we distinguish 'mythos' from logos? 
Thus far we have seen that symbolic tales or ritualised action represent a complex 
and complicated object of study, entailing the structuring in conceptual systems, 
and the collective modulation of sentiments in symbolic performances. 'Mythos' 
and 'logos' may run parallel or be intertwined, and the fact that symbolic phenom-
ena are concrete, evocative, imaginative, and affective suggests that they involve 
other functions and faculties than conscious cognition and decision-making. 
However, we are still left with the question of the precise relationship between 
symbolic and rational thinking and the question whether symbolic tales in fact 
constitute a separate category of thought. Of course the answer will depend on 
what we are thinking of when we apply the expression 'pensee mythique, pensiero 
mitico, mythisches Denken, mythical thinking.' 
The question of distinguishing 'mythos' from 'logos' or symbolic expression 
from rational thought should then be addressed in a more systematic way. In order 
to handle this problem we have to establish a distinction between the social as well 
as the biological aspects of the phenomena we are discussing, their why and how. 
The distinction between symbolic (mythical) and rational thought may at first be 
considered as a social question, the way we apprehend and act within our social 
world. Next it is a question of what human faculties we draw upon, the psycholog-
ical question. I will first address the question of the social aspects of the 'mythos'-
'logos' distinction, with an obvious point stated by the anthropologist Richard 
Shweder: 'Whereas all peoples assert beliefs, true and false, ordinary language and 
thought aims to do more than merely report and represent the causal structure of 
reality.' 145 Besides rationality, which has irrationality as its counterpart, a failure to 
apply the standards that have been set for rational reasoning, there is always this 
third category, which Shweder labels the non-rational. 146 Pointing to the inevitably 
arbitrariness of culture Shweder stresses the fundamental fact that people create 
'frames, paradigms, constitutive presuppositions: that is 'statement[s] about the 
world whose validity can be neither confirmed nor disconfirmed.' 147 In spite of this 
fact, we as humans are incessantly driven to 'prove' the improvable, to anchor our 
culturally created view of the world. The rules of a culture may be explicit, but this 
is not necessarily so. 148 The more fundamental the rules, the more they are implic-
it. 149 These patterns and rules are not unlike our grammatical knowledge, and are 
part of our 'tacit knowledge.' 150 The rational and descriptive is thus complemented 
145 Shweder 1984a:12. 
146 Shweder 1984b:38ff. 'where the canons of rationality, validity, truth, and efficiency are simply 
beside the point- irrelevant ... there is something more to thinking than reason and evi-
dence-culture, the arbitrary, the symbolic, the expressive, the semiotic- ... a realm where man 
is free to create his own distinctive symbolic universe.' 
14 7 Shweder 1984b:40. 
so SYNN0VE DES BOUVRIE 
by the non-rational normative meanings of culture, which are 'shared, collective, 
supra-individual' and organized. 151 These shared meanings are often 'disguised in 
symbolic forms.' 152 We should then distinguish the rational, instrumental, argu-
mentative (and innumerable other kinds of) thinking from the non-rational, cul-
tural creation of shared meanings. 
These patterns, however, should not be understood as just offering a conceptu-
alising of the world. 153 When studying 'symbolic tales; then, we should not only in-
vestigate the way they structure the world in classificatory systems but also their 
possible directive and evocative aspects. loan Lewis warns against exclusively con-
ceiving of symbols as a sign language. 154 In symbolic activity not only are the ac-
tions of the participants stylised, there are prescribed states of feeling as well, 
modelled into sentiments according to culturally valid patterns. Relating this to 
the subcategory of'symbolic tale; we may assume that the tone that is evoked in 
the tale should be given proper attention. This aspect might as well account for the 
distinction between e.g. folk-tale and 'myth' within our cultural area, the one in-
ducing hopeful belief in chance, a lucky fate, the other, based upon the serious be-
148 LeVine 1984:76 '[people] take for granted as self-evident responses to what is and what ought to 
be ... what informants find difficult to verbalize is more important, fundamental in the cultural 
organization of ideas than what they can verbalize.' 
149 'Much of culture is not recoverable through straitforward ethnographic interviewing' (Levine 
1984:77). 
150 Sperber 1975:x. 
151 LeVine 1984:72 'The "shreds and patches" concept of culture has simply not survived the test of 
intensive field investigation, because the ethnographer ... discovers the orderliness not only in 
their communicative conventions but in their version of "common sense," the framework of 
ideas from which they view, and act upon, the world. The framework ... is an organized set of 
contexts from which customary beliefs and practices derive their meaning.' 
152 LeVine, 1984:77. 
153 Cultural meaning systems, according to Roy D'Andrade (1984:89), are more than 'purely repre-
sentational in character', these meaning systems 'have directive and evocative as well as represen-
tational functions,' that is, they direct our actions and evoke cultural feelings. Cf 'Meanings 
represent the world, create cultural entities, direct one to do certain things, and evoke certain 
feelings. These four functions of meaning-the representational, the constructive, the directive, 
and the evocative-are differentially elaborated in particular meaning systems, but are always 
present to some degree in any system' (96). Cf ' ... ideas, feelings, and intentions are all activated 
by symbols and are thus part of the meaning of symbols. In general, there are a variety of lines of 
evidence that indicate that any human system of meaning is likely to involve affect' (99). 
154 Lewis 1977:lf. 'that symbols possess a cognitive aspect which is legitimately explored in this 
fashon [Levi-Strauss] is not in question. But the danger is that, infatuated with this style of anal-
ysis, we should forget that the ultimate force of symbols depends at least as much on their power 
to stir the emotions, moving men to action and reaction.' Cf 'This excessive emphasis on think-
ing and cognitive processes neglects, or seriously underestimates, the powerful emotional charge 
which all effective symbols carry ... the study of symbols must include the study of sentiments' 
(Preface:vii). 
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lief in inexorable doom. 155 Still we have to notice what audience is addressed. So 
traditional images, known as mundus inversus images, staging 'lamb eats wolf; 
'stag hunts hunter,' 'ox slaughters butcher,' 'peasant riding-king walking,' 'wife 
scourges husband' etc., have served as an expression of revolt among the poor, 
while in another age and milieu they undermined the subversive effect, rousing 
laughter at the idea of revolt. 156 
Anthroplogists studying the telling or staging of tales in their living context are 
in a fortunate position, because they can still observe the affective tone of the tell-
ing or dramatising situation, as well as the level of authority assigned to the tale. 
This may often result in the mapping out of a wide range of genres. An example is 
Gary Gossen's study of the Chamula tradition in Chiapas, Mexico, a people speak-
ing Tzotzil, a Maya language. This culture which ranges its speech performances 
along a scale running from 'cold' to 'hot' tales, corresponding to the cosmic hier-
archy centering around the sun(!), acknowledges different kinds of verbal behav-
iour, which are increasingly stylized. 'Competent language use, like the sun, is 
characterized by measure, controlled patterns of intensity.' 157 
The symbolically ordered world is not anything given. Our cultural meaning 
systems need repair, an activity that is incessantly going on everywhere. Unlike 
statements about the world which it may be sufficient to make once, symbolic 
messages need to be revived precisely because they do not just present informa-
tion, but revive the sentiments of the participants. 158 What is fundamental about 
'symbolic tales' is not their meaning, being either true or false, but their effect, in 
Bourdieu's terms their 'efficacite.' He would not speak of'meaning' in the sense of 
155 Peradotto 1973:57. 
156 Kunzle 1978. 
157 Gossen 1989:391. Gossen offers a very interesting catalogue of recognized genres of speech, 
which distinguishes, for example, 'Recent words: true recent narrative' and 'Recent words: frivo-
lous language: The 'true recent narrative' genre is performed by 'speakers [who] are excited' 
( 400) using redunancy and 'speech for people whose hearts are heated.' 'What "true recent narra-
tive" accomplishes with prose accounts of true breaches of the social order, "frivolous language" 
accomplishes with laughter. The genre consists of five subgenres .... All of these express or refer 
to ambiguous or deviant behavior, and elicit laughter from participants and onlookers. Laughter 
appears to underline the norm by placing the diviant or ambiguous item of behavior in sharp 
relief against the norm' (404f.). The performance of 'Ancient words: true ancient narrative' 
shares many properties with the 'true recent narrative' genre, the important difference being the 
temporal dimension, while ancient words refer to the first three creations, before the present 
fourth in Chamula cosmology. This genre, referring to the crucial, basic knowledge, is character-
ised by greater stylistic redundancy and metaphorical restatement of an idea ( 408), and it is near 
the 'Ancient words: prayer' genre, which carries still greater metaphorical heat (409). 
158 D'Andrade 1984:105 notes 'In most human groups the communication of messages, both 
framed [telling what the original message is about] and unframed, is so frequent that it suggests 
the hypothesis that meaning systems need messages to keep themselves alive. Without relatively 
constant activation perhaps meaning systems disintegrate.' 
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some cognitive content, but their 'effect' in transforming people's notions of them-
selves and the world. 159 Here we may identify the 'aim' of symbolic tales. 
Furthermore there are the hidden effects of symbols, diverting the attention 
away from their essence. 160 And the way symbolic meaning systems also tend to of-
fer concrete tales thereby shielding themselves from being discussed overtly and 
exposed to attack. 161 A basic property of symbolic processes is this dissimulation 
of the fact that they are symbolic in the sense of carrying cultural-that is arbi-
trary-meaning. 
We may here think of Bourdieu's notion of 'doxa,' the undiscussed. It is pre-
cisely because of this dissimulation that the category of'myth' is such an elusive en-
tity. Myths cease to work at the moment they are recognised. In Bourdieu's terms, 
the most fundamental 'ideas' in society are those, which are withdrawn from open 
discourse and exchange of (orthodox and heterodox) opinions. 162 Belonging to the 
opaque realm of the 'undiscussed (undisputed)' or 'doxa: fundamental cultural 
truths are removed from the vision of the members of society, and relegated to a 
status of 'nature.' However, what I think is most important in his model of the 
workings of culture, is not the realm of the undiscussed, implicit meanings, values, 
or structures, but the borderline between the realms of 'opinion' and the 'undis-
cussed (undisputed): It is this borderline, which in reality manifests itself in a 
number of (unconscious) practices, which merits our attention. And it is here that 
the proper arena for 'symbolic phenomena' is to be found, filling a difficult task of 
transmitting the culturally valued, and at the same time dissimulating that it is this 
they are doing. 
159 Speaking about initiation rites Bourdieu (1982:124) underscores' ... l'efficacite symbolique est 
tout a fait reelle en ce qu'elle transforme tout a fait Ia personne consacree.' Cf 'La croyance de 
tous, qui preexiste le rituel, est Ia condition de l'efficacite du rituel' (133). 
160 Bourdieu analyses male initiation, contrary to other analyses not by emphasising the passage 
itself, separating the initiated from the uninititated, the real focus of interest for analysis is the 
unnoticed borderline dividing those who are eligible to being initiated from those (females) who 
are not. 'L'effet majeure du rite est celui qui passe le plus completement inapper~u' (1982:122). 
In this way the ritual diverts the attention from the heart of the matter to some unimportant ele-
ment, the passage, thereby consecrating or naturalising an arbitrary distinction between 
(socially) male and female. 
161 This is what Moore and Myerhoff refer to, when explaining the 'presentational' quality of sym-
bolic phenomena (1977:8). 
162 Bourdieu 1977:168. The term 'idea' is here misleading, because Bourdieu himself is eager to 
stress that one of the fundamental vehicles for cultural patterns is in fact the body with its senses 
and sentiments, carrying our 'habitus.' 
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How does 'mythical' vs. logical thought operate? 
The question whether symbolic tales in fact exist must be followed into the field of 
psychology. The social processes are after all created by individual minds and 
therefore there is a continuum between the collective shaping of culture and indi-
vidual psyches. 163 After our discussion on the 'why' of symbolic phenomena in the 
social world, we have to address the 'how,' the recurring question whether there 
does exist something like a distinction between 'mythical thought, la pensee 
mythique, mythisches Denken, il pensiero mitico' on the one hand, and rational 
thinking on the other. In some quarters it is answered in the affirmative, but some-
times it is firmly denied, 164 while others ignore the issue. This question has already 
been reformulated into the statement that 'myth' is not to be conceived of as the 
opposite of 'logos' as irrationality, because it does not handle falsifiable proposi-
tions. As a non-rational ordering of the world, symbolic phenomena fulfil the 
complex task of creating culture. 165 The problem then arises, what are in fact 'sym-
bolic phenomena' in psychological terms? 
While we are well acquainted with the functioning of conscious and logical rea-
soning, most of us have only vague knowledge of the symbolic mode of ordering the 
world. Cultural phenomena are mostly studied as social entities, while their possible 
psychological properties have not been subjected to an equal amount of investi-
gation.166 While I do not pretend to have an expert's command of neurobiology, I 
think we have to consider the data available from the field of psychology, which are 
sufficiently mapped out to be incorporated in the study of symbolic phenomena. 
What comes first to mind are the 'primary processes' as studied by Sigmund 
Freud, a category of reactions to the world, which is opposed to 'secondary proc-
esses.'167 Freud associated primary processes mainly with the workings of dreams, 
in that they operate subconsciously through images instead of conscious verbal 
thought, that is, secondary processes. Freud's theory of the workings of dreams, 
then, stresses first and foremost their imaginative nature, their manifestation as 
images. It includes their tendency to collapse images from different moments in 
163 See Lewis 1977. 
164 E.g. Buxton 1994:5 'Nor, emphatically, do I wish to suggest that myths are generated by "the 
imagination," in the sense of a particular mental faculty, perhaps even to be differentiated from 
"reason": the existence of such a faculty is quite chimerical.' Detienne and Calame have been 
mentioned earlier. 
165 Shweder, 1984b: 38. 
166 Victor Turner has devoted considerable attention to the psychological dimensions of cultural 
symbols, at first provisionally in his studies referred to earlier, later he incorporated psychologi-
cal results more systematically into his work (Turner 1985). Inspired by: d'Aquili, Laughlin and 
McManus 1979. Turner 1977. 
167 Freud 1921:435ff. 'Der Primar- und der Sekundiirvorgang.' 
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time thus wiping out temporal and causal relationships ('condensation'), further-
more the property of transferring the energy of emotionally charged impressions 
in real experience to insignificant elements in the dream image ('displacement' [of 
emotional energy]), thus disguising the source of anxiety, and finally the frequent 
operation of 'inversion,' the exchange of image-elements according to principles of 
similarity and contrast. 
Freud's focus of interest was of course to account for the operation of the dy-
namic subconscious, the psyche's urge to shield our real but socially unacceptable 
impulses from becoming manifest to ourselves and disturbing us in our sleep. The 
images thus masking our real self he labelled 'symbols,' which he in the course of 
time came to identify as masks for our erotic impulses, a content he did not iden-
tify in the earliest phase of his thinking on dream processes. This narrowing down 
of what initially was conceived of as a wide range of dream motives has created an 
unfortunate barrier of scepsis around the theory. It has been criticised by Charles 
Rycroft, who thinks anthropologists still should pay attention to the very abstract 
notions which have been formulated about the workings of dreams. 168 In an at-
tempt at modifying the theory of dreams to a theory of culture Percy Cohen sug-
gests that cultural symbolisations (e.g. tales) may draw on materials which are 
stored in the dynamic unconscious (i.e. forbidden impulses and dreams). 169 This 
suggestion still departs from the assumption that 'primary processes' manifest 
themselves in dreams only, and that their function characteristically is that of dis-
guising erotic impulses. These assumptions, according to Rycroft, are too narrow, 
and we should then return to Freud's earlier concept of symbols as representations 
of'everything that comprises man's biological destiny.' 170 
There is another aspect to this problem. We have been told that the Freudian 
dynamic unconscious mind is a mechanism which works in order to shield our 
unacceptable drives against society's censure. However, if the theory of symbolic/ 
dream/primary processes maintains that these processes are operating in order to 
disguise our hidden drives when confronted with censure, the same theory does not 
seem to explain where this inner censure stems from, it is simply taken for granted. 171 
168 Rycroft 1977. 
169 Cohen 1980:65f. 'in societies in which people are closer to nature and to natural processes ... 
there will be a greater and more obvious tendency for certain processes of cultural symbolisation 
to call upon the resources of the dynamic unconscious.' 
170 Rycroft 1977:139. 
171 Freud 1921:99ff. where the author represents the nature of'die Zensur', that is, our internalised 
inhibitions, offering as his 'argument' only the analogy of a situation when somebody is dissim-
ulating ('sich entstellt') out of fear of a more poweful person and the analogy of writers fearing 
political censure. No psychological mechanisms are invoked in order to demonstrate the estab-
lishment of censure. 
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Can it be that the norms and rules of society have been installed in our mind 
through the very same processes? Instead of taking for granted that censure simply 
is operating, we may assume that it has been established in our psyche through the 
same complicated processes as our defense mechanisms, creating the 'summaris-
ing and elaborating' symbols, whith their culturally shaped sentiments of what is 
valuable, normal or honourable and their counterparts. 
There are reasons to accept such an assumption. Not only does Rycroft claim 
that 'symbolism [in the Freudian sense of'primary processes'] is a general capacity 
of the mind; 172 there are other scholars who argue in the same direction. Dan Sper-
ber studying the relationship between our rational and our symbolic processing 
capacities, defends the latter against a pervasive suspicion of primitivity. 173 As a 
matter of fact Freud, even though he demonstrates deep fascination with dream 
processes, consistently refers to these human capacities as something phylogenet-
ically as well as ontogenetically primordial and primitive, prior to conscious, ver-
bal reasoning manifesting itself in the secondary processes. 174 There is, according 
to Sperber, no reason to assume this priority (and hence primitivity) of our imag-
inative faculty, which Rycroft describes as a capacity 'which can be used both by 
the discursive, syntactical, rational form of thinking characteristic of waking, in-
tellectual activity ("secondary process thinking" in psychoanalytical terminology) 
and by the non-discursive, condensive, affective form of thinking characteristic of 
dreaming, imagining, joking and creating ("primary process thinking" in psycho-
analytical terminology) and by recognising that these two types of thinking are not 
necessarily opposed to one another, as most formulations of psychoanalytical the-
ory imply, but can work in harness.' 175 It is obvious that the psychic mechanisms 
at work are extremely complicated, and that we cannot separate the functioning of 
one half of our brain temporally from the other half. It seems, then, that Freud's 
'primary processes' do not only manifest themselves as dreams, they are embedded 
in various psychic activities. 
This is confirmed by a psychological monograph on the phenomenon of'intu-
ition' by Tony Bastick who presents results from psychophysiological experiments 
172 Rycroft 1977:139. 
173 Sperber 1980:29. 
17 4 Freud 1921:446. We could argue that the theory of primary and secondary processes and their 
internal hierarchy could be called a modern myth itself, in that it 'describes' the 'nature' of the 
human mind, while implicitly confirming a culturally created ordering of mental activities into 
more and less civilised (corresponding to the widespread dichotomy of'male' and 'female' psy-
chic make-up, logical reasoning seen as a masculine prerogative, and unorderly and affective 
thinking as female). 
175 Rycroft 1977:139. 
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which suggest that part of our answers may be found here. 176 The author examines 
a great number of studies on this human faculty and concludes that it can be con-
trasted with logical/analytic reasoning by a number of properties. Eastick defends 
this cognitive faculty of'intuition' (which he recognises as Freud's 'primary proc-
esses'177 and the functions of the right cerebral hemisphere178) against prejudices 
of primitivity, and summarises the properties of this ability, which not only is not 
primitive, but can be developed as an eminently human faculty of problem solving 
at the heart of scientific creativity. 179 
'The intuitive process is preconscious, but analytic thought is entirely a con-
scious discipline ... Analytic thought is a linear step-by-step often slow process 
whereas intuitive thought is sudden and depends on parallel processing of a global 
field of knowledge, whereas analytic thought only compares two elements at a time 
... : 180 Intuition is thus activated when our logic reasoning falls short of solving 
complex problems. It is at the roots of our conceptualising and creative faculties, 
the eureka experience of mathematicians and inventors, while operating by simi-
larity and contrast. 'Intuition depends on physiological functions, e.g. understand-
ing by feeling and instinct, and most importantly empathy .... However, pure 
analytic thought, pure reason, or pure intellect in contrast to intuition is consid-
ered to be entirely independent of physiology, e.g. machine intelligence. It is con-
sidered in this investigation, however, that what generally is called analytic thought 
is, like all thought, interwoven with our intuitive processes and cannot exist inde-
pendentlY:181 'Unlike the analytic process of reasoning, intuition is not logical but 
categorizes on common associated feelings rather than common logical properties 
'182 
Among the other basic properties of the intuitive process are: preverbal ordering 
of the world, emotional involvement ('analytic thought is "cold" and emotion-
free'), dependent on past experiences and the present situation of the intuiter, 
176 Eastick 1982:2 'Intuition is a powerful human faculty, perhaps the most universal natural ability 
we posses.' In Ch. 1 Eastick reviews the scientific literature of the last 75 years on the subject. 
177 Eastick 1982:143,320, cf 355. 
178 Eastick 1982:188, ' ... the left cerebral hemisphere as linear, time-oriented, rational, analytic, and 
verbal, with the right hemisphere as non-linear, lateral-thinking, intuitive, artistic, and creative.' 
179 Eastick 1982:310. 
180 Eastick 1982:51. In the middle ages the distinction between the two modes of cognition were 
acknowledged as 'ratio' and 'intellectus.' The famous matematician Henri Poincare contrasts 
intuition with logical thought and notes the insufficiency of the latter (Eastick 52). 'We believe 
that in our reasonings we do no longer appeal to intuition, the philosophers will tell us this is an 
illusion. Pure logic could never lead us to anything but tautologies; it could create nothing new 
... it is by logic that we prove. It is by intuition that we discover' (Poincare, cited by Eastick 2). 
181 Eastick 1982:52 
182 Eastick 1982:52. 
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('analytic thought is considered independent of personal experience'), and empa-
thy, kinaesthetic or other, an understanding by feeling. 183 
The fact that our intuitive-creative capacity is something relatively unknown 
and misunderstood,184 may be due to the very condition that its paths are with-
drawn from verbal conscious reasoning, it represents an ordering and patterning 
along principles of similarity and contrast, an essential mechanism being the af-
fective charges in concepts which serve as retrieving devices. This evocative process 
enables us to solve problems (e.g. recognising faces) that are far too complicated 
for logic-analytical reasoning, and it seems that it serves as the privileged instru-
ment of creativity as well. 
Culture being first and foremost something which is ingrained in our senses 
and nerves appeals to this imaginative-affective ordering faculty when categorising 
and creating boundaries and contrasts. It would not surprise us then that the cul-
tural process seems to appeal to the same human faculty when it comes to creating 
shared meanings. Sperber argues that the very richness of responses to a given 
stimulus causes individual evocations to be idiosyncratic, unless they are restricted 
into a shared common symbolism during socialisation, an elimination of individ-
ual evocation when members of a group learn to prefer the culturally correct evo-
cations, especially in 'prescribed cultural contexts.' 185 This synchronisation of 
evocations seems to be the province of 'symbolic' tales, ritual and iconography 
('symbolic tales' being here a shorthand for all sorts of'traditional; that is, culture-
creating tales, drama, jokes and riddles), which intuitively create order without ex-
plicitly stating its principles, precisely in order to withdraw them from critical 
non-affective reasoning, which cannot provide the matrices of culture. 186 
Culture then, being a non-rational process, has recourse to the creative order-
ing abilities of the human mind, the intuitive-primary processes being responsible 
for our symbolic understanding and ordering of the world. Symbolic workings 
183 Tony Bastick, 1982:51. 
184 Tony Bastick, 1982: I f., 'Insight or intuition is relevant to all fields of study and all walks of life. It 
is a universal experience, little understood but treasured and sought after by all. The intuitions of 
great men, the "Eureka" experiences that have pushed forward the frontiers of knowledge, that 
have produced technologies moulding civilization .... But there has been little investigation into 
intuition. There seems to have been a spiritual mystique surrounding this invaluable faculty: 
185 Sperber 1980:35 denies that symbolism should be described as a 'language,' because its rules are 
too multifarious to respond to anything like a grammar (34). However in so far as symbolism is 
something operating in a collective in the sense of shared meanings, it works in the same way as 
language. 'Symbolic representation does not demonstrate the truth but presupposes it,' it is 
opposed to encyclopedic knowledge. Symbolic knowledge is not empirically verifiable, and 
immune to falsification. Symbolism is independent of verbalisation, but dependent on C011Cep-
tualisation and evocation. 
186 E.g. d'Aquili and Laughlin 1979. 
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would thus seem to involve the creation of collective images charged with specific 
affective qualities. They may explain why there is a remarkable tendency among 
many groups to couch culturally meaningful messages in a concrete form. This 
may account for the fact that cultural patterns often are considered to be 'tacit' 
knowledge, as are the rules of our grammar. In these imaginative expressions caus-
al-temporal ordering seems to be less essential than dimensions of similarity and 
contrast. We may likewise understand the widespread occurrence of contrastive 
images and inversions as a major function of intuitive-primary process ordering 
and disordering. And in particular we may accept the affective qualities of these ex-
pressions as something especially apt at creating the boundaries and values of cul-
ture. 
First conclusions on the definition of 'symbolic tales' 
While we may not be able to draw an absolute borderline between 'mythos' and 
'logos' in either social or psychological terms, we should at least be entitled to use 
the distinction analytically. We may separate intuitive-creative thinking as the in-
strument which is dominant in symbolic processes, as opposed to logical-analytic 
thinking for instrumental activities. We may sort symbolic expressions whose pri-
mary function is to attract audiences towards a magnetic centre ('summarizing 
symbols') and those which create cultural patterns and order experience or action 
('elaborating symbols', in Sherry Ortner's terms), from speech which primarily 
serves empirical and practical purposes. Intuitive-creative processing is funda-
mentally imaginative-affective, and phenomena which create culture are operating 
through affectively charged imagery. It seems that there is a fleeting boundary be-
tween the realms of'mythos' and 'logos.' However, as we have seen, the creation of 
culture is a process which takes place in darkness, a hidden persuasion that seeks 
to dissimulate its paths. The process will try to hide the spaces where the cultural, 
arbitrary symbols of'naturalness and normality' are being created and modelled. 
The boundary between 'mythos' and 'logos: then, is to be studied in the area of 
tales which are accepted by a group (carrying authority and an aura of truth or a 
special fascination). The boundary runs between (symbolic) tales presenting a 
message which is to be intuited with the imagination, and which rouses cultural 
sentiments without being perceived as 'mere arbitrary'; and discursive speech, 
which offers propositions (orders, wishes and so forth) and arguements. It is by 
mobilising sentiments around specific culturally charged symbols, images or tales, 
a specific kind of fascination, instead of coolly reporting, describing the world, 
that the 'symbolic process' functions. 
In creating symbols we subconsciously create magnetic fields, charged with 
meaning and value, which are grasped by a community (small or large), images 
which draw us towards their magnetic centre, evoking sentiments, that is, cultur-
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ally orchestrated reactions of different nature, a feeling of what is 'honourable' or, 
on the contrary, abnormal, either abhorrence at what is shocking or laughter at the 
absurd, a scale ranging from sacred to sacrilegious, through honourable and dis-
honourable to natural and unnatural. These implicit boundaries of the normal, 
'natural' and honourable are essentially affective in nature, and they may be creat-
ed not by arguing, but by presentations which respect these boundaries or trans-
gress them, by images evoking the ideal world, but more effectively by images 
which invert that world, either in a revolting or in a ridiculous manner. 187 These 
shared sentiments of consent or of revolt or derision, shared with a community are 
at the core of symbolic phenomena. 
There is another aspect to this issue. It seems that the criticism of myth was not 
a phase in the development of Greek culture. When, as Veyne observes, 188 the 
Greeks did not stop, century after century, purifying their myths, this may mean 
that criticism was essential to the dynamics of mythical story telling. Traditional 
tales were to be summoned in highly varying performances and they had to em-
body a great variety of modes and moods. As Yunis, Mikalson and others have 
pointed out, the gods of cult differed markedly from the gods of tragic drama. 189 
No doubt the workings of tragedy demanded tales with violent disturbing actions, 
just as the workings of other genres operated in other keys. Isokrates refers to 'the 
heinous acts performed in other(!) cities (£v 'tat~ aA-A-au; 1tOA£<Jt), murder of 
brothers and fathers and guest-friends, slaughtering of mothers and incestuous re-
lationships resulting in children begotten with mothers, the devouring of children 
contrived by their closest kin, cases of exposure, drowning, blinding and a host of 
similar atrocities, of which there is never any lack in the traditional yearly theatre 
performances' (Isoc. Panath. 121). The evocation of moods and motives is due to 
the fact that symbolic phenomena do not exclusively map the world in categories 
and conceptual schemata. 190 They stimulate cultural sentiments in order to pro-
voke, rouse laughter, or fulfill various cultural needs, in short, create specific kinds 
of fascination, which are essential to their meaning and which we are to incorpo-
rate into our analysis. 
It is evident that tales which have once filled a role as 'culture-creating (sym-
bolic) tale' may be told in new ages and environments. In order to account for the 
passage of specific (traditional) tales from the social use ('Anwendung') in one 
187 For the way ambiguous ('either or') or ambivalent ('both') images may generate energy and the 
feeling of dynamic potency, see Green 1997. 
188 Veyne 1983:13. 
189 See references above. 
190 Vernant 1990:25f. ' ... ce role de miroir renvoyant au groupe humain sa propre image, lui per-
mettant de se saisir dans sa dependance it I' egard du sa ere, de se definir face aux lmmortels ... ' 
(emphasis added). 
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community to another, which does not share the meaning/value systems of the 
former group, we have to remind ourselves of the fact that the symbolic quality is 
not anything inherent in the tale, but arises from the interaction between the com-
munity's cultural ordering and valorisation and the elements of the tale. While the 
same material is carried on in a new group or an altered age, the affective and cul-
tural meanings have disappeared with the old audience, leaving a different effect 
upon the new one. In order to grasp this transference of the tale's substance to a 
new context with loss of cultural meaning, I would propose to apply the distinc-
tion between 'hot' and 'cold' 'myths.' 
Addressing once more the problem signalled by Calame, 'il n'y a pas d' essence 
ni du mythe, ni de la mythologie,' we may attempt at defining, if not 'myth,' at least 
something we could agree upon to call 'symbolic tale.' The every-day term 'myth' 
which we arbitrarily, intuitively, a priori, apply to the corpus of stories that we for 
some centuries have agreed upon calling so, is of course a charged term. It conveys 
the misleading connotation of 'untruth,' quite to the contrary of what 'symbolic 
tales' amount to among 'natives.' 
Still, there were other paths to explore. I have suggested that the broader cate-
gory of 'symbolic phenomena' includes narratives, which we may call 'symbolic 
tales,' by a definition that is operational in that it comprises narratives, allusions 
and images. What I would propose then is to identify and define these tales, not 
from their semantic or structural aspects, nor from their narrative nature, nor 
their genre properties, 191 but from their ability to create culture. Since culture is 
basically something ingrained in our senses and feelings, 192 these tales will mobi-
lise our cultural imagination and sensibility, evoking images and feelings of what 
is natural and normal, honourable, right, desirable, understandable and their con-
traries: unnatural and abnormal, shameful, wrong, abhorrent, and absurd. These 
sentiments are necessarily tied to concrete entities, imaginable situations, spatial 
dimensions, which in addition demand continually to be renewed. 193 Avoiding 
terms as (mythical) 'thinking,' 'messages,' 'language' and cognate expressions, 194 we 
should devise a scholarly terminology which conveys the connotations I have sug-
gested, the imaginative and evocative aspects of the 'symbolic.' Expressions as 
191 Calame 1988:9 ' ... pas plus que sur les elements semantiques susceptibles de definir un mythe, 
sur Ia forme litteraire qui pourrait le designer !'accord n'a pas pu se faire.' 
192 Geertz 1975. 
193 Cf 'habitus', Bourdieu 1977; 'habit-memory,' Connerton 1989. See also Bouvrie 1995. 
194 Keesing 1991:376f. draws attention to the difference between symbolists and cognitivists, in that 
the latter view their activity as scientific whereas the former are interpretive, the cognitive 
approach studying 'the pool of common-sense knowledge, and understandings of the commu-
nity and encoded in its language.' However, when focusing on language, what cognitiv gains in 
scientificity, it loses in understanding the imaginary and affective qualities of culture. 
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'evocative' are useful since it conveys both the idea of images and of sentiments, 
and the same is true for 'symbol,' although the term has been appropriated and un-
acceptably narrowed down in Freudian vocabulary. A corollary of the approach 
suggested is that we cannot discard the concrete text/image, in Reuben Brower's 
words, 'there are no myths, only versions ... only texts for interpretation, whether 
the text is written or oral, a piece of behavior ... a drawing or painting .... ' 195 The 
same plot, I assume, can be put to contrary effect through the sentiments it seeks 
to rouse in different versions. A study of their cultural meaning has to take into ac-
count the prescribed sentiments of the performance. 
We may then develop our definition: 
A 'symbolic tale' presents 
-'summarizing' or 'elaborating' expressions, 
which imply the 'truth' instead of stating it or arguing for it, 
providing 
-'explanations' which are pseudo-explanations because fundamental 
premisses may be suppressed and their missing masqued, in short, 
-a tale which aims at achieving effect instead of presenting an explicit prop-
osition, not because some power instance is manipulating the unaware, but 
because these non-rational workings are inherent in the process of culture. 
In fact both powerful and powerless may be unaware of what is going on, 
exchanging a tale that has an altogether other effect than the message it pro-
fesses to deliver. 
A 'symbolic tale' is 
- a tale, which is enveloped in an aura of factuality, accepted by an group, 
attracting a group to a magnetic centre and mobilising towards some core 
values (summarising symbols) or sorting out conceptual experience and 
construing conceptions of the world, charging them with value (elaborating 
symbols). 
-'Symbolic tales' arise not from the lack of ways of thinking alternatively, 
but because this is the only way of creating unfalsifiable truth, that is, having 
an effect upon the audience, effecting subconscious conceptions and motiva-
tions (sentiments of identity, cultural boundaries, honour, shame, duties 
etc.). 
-'Symbolic tales' are nothing less than verbal magic, created by the domi-
nance of the right hemisphere processes, our imaginative, emotional, order-
ing faculty, non-verbal in principle and based on similarity and contrast, as 
opposed to the non-emotional linear/temporal/causal dimensions of the 
left hemisphere or secondary processes. 
195 Brower 1971:155. 
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If'symbolic tales' are verbal artefacts, they are fed with this imaginative, conden-
sating, evocative force, and if, on the surface they pretend to offer an account of 
time and place, or cause, this is only the surface, the concrete, imaginary tale, while 
underneath cultural values are at stake. This surface is presented, not because peo-
ple cannot reflect rationally, but in order to discourage reflection, because this 
might induce people to doubt or to reject the 'truth.' 'Symbolic tales' cannot there-
fore be identified with the bare pattern of plot, abstracted from its surface tale with 
all its emotional effects. Masking the arbitrariness of cultural systems of a partic-
ular power system, they may create indisputable truths, as opposed to truths that 
are arrived at through discussion and argument. Symbolism handles the unargu-
able, just as we cannot argue for 'what is the true language' or 'what is the true way 
of living'. Language and culture are beyond the true/false dichotomy and out of 
reach from empirical verification. 
Symbolism structures everyday experience, but just as there are 'special occa-
sions; celebrations, which are set apart from the everyday business of instrumental 
activity, there are 'special tales; separated from rational discursive speech, engag-
ing, stimulating, mobilising towards a collective focus. They partake in the indis-
pensable 'social work' in the process of creating new communities and 
maintaining them, as well as in demolishing old ones. 
'Symbolic tales' are disguised as tales with a linear movement, and causal rea-
soning, behind which there may be hidden an essential structure of (affective cul-
tural) meaning. They move the attention away from this meaning, towards the 
linear story, the chains of cause and effect, the development of drama. This struc-
ture is created by other means than conscious reasoning (the left hemisphere and 
secondary processes, working through linear thinking, with its temporal/causal 
links). While discursive tales explicitly state their argument, symbolic, intuitive-
creative or primary processes dissimulating the issue or pretending some argu-
ment, work through similarity and contrast. The symbolic truth is more easily 
driven home by contrast, when normality is violated and the implied truths are 
challenged, either in a horrifying (e.g. tragic) or in hilarious (comic) challenge. By 
rousing these reactions the tale confirms the very cultural boundaries in the senti-
ments of the audience, which are being violated in the tale. 
The meaning then of a 'symbolic tale' is its effect. 'Symbolic tales' are indispen-
sable to social life, they prove the unprovable, and order individual experience and 
action, or they transform individuals into groups mobilising them towards a com-
mon magnetic center. The same can be said of collective, culturally shared and ex-
changed, imagery. And in analysing these phenomena we have once more to be 
aware of the fact that symbolic phenomena are not simply representing reality, of-
fering a picture, an experience of the world. They may challenge the normal world 
order of the group, creating disorder and provoking their cultural sentiments and 
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thereby revitalising that world. The example of the Greek manipulation of the 'the 
Amazons' illustrates this. Wherever they appear these anti-women provoke the 
culturally shaped image of the normal woman, no doubt in order to recreate it. 
Other tales may launch a new world subverting the established 'truths.' 
We may then discuss how we should develop further methods for studying the 
'symbolic' elements in Ancient culture taking account of the propositions made in 
this paper and refining the definition of the phenomena with which we are dealing. 
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